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16. Marginalia in John Sergeant’s Method to Science (1696)

Section 1 (of 1)

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Inside cover: ‘Liber Jo: Locke ex Dono Authoris.’

Method, I.i.6, p. 2: ‘That these Notions are the very Natures of the Thing, or the Thing it self existing in us intellectually, and not a bare Idea or Similitude of it, appears hence evidently, that when we say interiourly, or judge A Stone is hard, we do not intend to affirm, That the Likeness or Idea of a Stone is hard, but the very Stone it self. And were it not so, the Proposition would be false; (for the Similitude of a Stone in our Mind is not Hard:) whereas yet we are well assur’d that Proposition is True.’

Locke: ‘The Idea then of a stone in our mind is not hard. but the Notion of a stone in our mind is hard.’

Method, I.v, Corrol. I, p. 53: ‘Therefore the Quantity of the whole World is One Uninterrupted Continuity, and the World it self (speaking of Quantitive Unity) One Great Continuum.

Locke: ‘And consequently but one body’

Method, II.ii.17, p. 148: ‘There is another kind of Self-evidence call’d Practical, which is Inferiour to this we have hitherto spoken of, and Proper to the Vulgar. This is call’d Self-evidence, not because its Evidence is seen in the very Notion of the Terms, as was the other, but because it is bred or instill’d from the Things themselves without Speculation or Study, by a Practical converse with those things.’

Locke: ‘v. p. 266

Method, III.iii.8, p. 253: ‘To know more distinctly what this Definition means, we may ask what a Proposition is, and what True means, and it will be answered that a Proposition is defin’d, A Speech by which one Notion is Affirm’d (or Deny’d) of another.’

Locke: ‘By this accound a dumb and deaf man cannot be rational’

Method, III.iii.9, p. 253, on ‘Proper Middle Terms’: ‘…they are taken from the Definitions, afforded us by the Genus and Difference in each Line, both parts of which Definitions are Essential.’

Locke: ‘This is all verbal and teaches noe thing but what he knows who knows the signification or definition of the word he uses.’

Method, III.iv, Note II, p. 266: ‘Whence we may, with a humble Acknowledgement and Thanks, reflect on the Infinite Goodness of the God of Truth, who unenviously bestows knowledge on all, who will dispose themselves to receive it; that, where-ever Art, by reason of our Shortness, is at a plunge, he supplies it by Practical Self-evidence, or the naturally instill’d Knowledge of the Vulgar…’

Locke: ‘This which he calls practical self evidence is noe more but this that the illiterate know often as well as the learned what the Ideas are which they make their words stand for and often better though they cannot give <a> Logical difinition of them. But in this there is noe self evidence at all. v. p 342

Method, III.viii, Corrol. IV, p. 342, on ‘Practical Self-Evidence’: ‘…that it is a solid Knowledge of the An est of the thing Attested, and, consequently, of the Conclusive Force of Tradition…’

Locke: ‘v: p. 266

Method, III.ix.19, p. 351: ‘Hence follows, that that Certainty they Nick-name [Moral] is in reality, Uncertainty.’

Locke: ‘Morally certain is soe certain that any action grounded on that certainty is morally good as if it were grounded on real knowledg.

Method, III.x., Corrol. II, p. 364: ‘And ’tis as ill to say GOD can suspend his Action of Conserving; for this takes away from GOD his Goodness, or the Redundancy, Exuberancy or Communicativeness of Being; which is Essential to him, and was the Sole Cause of the Creation.’

Locke: ‘By which reason the Creation must have been from Eternity and consequently the world eternal.’

Inside back cover, in Locke’s hand:

b. c4. d.3 d.5. 103. 277,8. 282. 284. 351, 368 385. 404. 410. 423

Diplomatic

Inside cover: ‘Liber Jo: Locke ex Dono Authoris.’

Method, I.i.6, p. 2: ‘That these Notions are the very Natures of the Thing, or the Thing it self existing in us intellectually, and not a bare Idea or Similitude of it, appears hence evidently, that when we say interiourly, or judge A Stone is hard, we do not intend to affirm, That the Likeness or Idea of a Stone is hard, but the very Stone it self. And were it not so, the Proposition would be false; (for the Similitude of a Stone in our Mind is not Hard:) whereas yet we are well assur’d that Proposition is True.’

Locke: ‘The Idea then of a stone in our mind is not hard. but the Notion of a stone in our mind is hard.’

Method, I.v, Corrol. I, p. 53: ‘Therefore the Quantity of the whole World is One Uninterrupted Continuity, and the World it self (speaking of Quantitive Unity) One Great Continuum.

Locke: ‘And consequently but one body’

Method, II.ii.17, p. 148: ‘There is another kind of Self-evidence call’d Practical, which is Inferiour to this we have hitherto spoken of, and Proper to the Vulgar. This is call’d Self-evidence, not because its Evidence is seen in the very Notion of the Terms, as was the other, but because it is bred or instill’d from the Things themselves without Speculation or Study, by a Practical converse with those things.’

Locke: ‘v. p. 266’

Method, III.iii.8, p. 253: ‘To know more distinctly what this Definition means, we may ask what a Proposition is, and what True means, and it will be answered that a Proposition is defin’d, A Speech by which one Notion is Affirm’d (or Deny’d) of another.’

Locke: ‘By this accound a dumb and deaf man cannot be rational’

Method, III.iii.9, p. 253, on ‘Proper Middle Terms’: ‘…they are taken from the Definitions, afforded us by the Genus and Difference in each Line, both parts of which Definitions are Essential.’

Locke: ‘This is all verbal and teaches noe thing but what he knows who knows the signification or definition of the word he uses.’

Method, III.iv, Note II, p. 266: ‘Whence we may, with a humble Acknowledgement and Thanks, reflect on the Infinite Goodness of the God of Truth, who unenviously bestows knowledge on all, who will dispose themselves to receive it; that, where-ever Art, by reason of our Shortness, is at a plunge, he supplies it by Practical Self-evidence, or the naturally instill’d Knowledge of the Vulgar…’

Locke: ‘This which he calls practical self evidence is noe more but this that the illiterate know often as well as the learned what the Ideas are which they make their words stand for and often better though they cannot give <a> Logical difinition of them. But in this there is noe self evidence at all. v. p 342’

Method, III.viii, Corrol. IV, p. 342, on ‘Practical Self-Evidence’: ‘…that it is a solid Knowledge of the An est of the thing Attested, and, consequently, of the Conclusive Force of Tradition…’

Locke: ‘v: p. 266’

Method, III.ix.19, p. 351: ‘Hence follows, that that Certainty they Nick-name [Moral] is in reality, Uncertainty.’

Locke: ‘Morally certain is soe certain that any action grounded on that certainty is morally good as if it were grounded on real knowledg.’

Method, III.x., Corrol. II, p. 364: ‘And ’tis as ill to say GOD can suspend his Action of Conserving; for this takes away from GOD his Goodness, or the Redundancy, Exuberancy or Communicativeness of Being; which is Essential to him, and was the Sole Cause of the Creation.’

Locke: ‘By which reason the Creation must have been from Eternity and consequently the world eternal.’

Inside back cover, in Locke’s hand:

b. c4. d.3 d.5. 103. 277,8. 282. 284. 2351, 368 385. 404. 410. 423


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See below, quotation from Sergeant, Method, II.ii, note II, p 266.
See next marginalium.
See above, marginalium on Method, III.iv, Note II, p. 266.
The editors know of no other place in Locke’s works where reference is made to the concept of ‘moral certainty’; cf. Descartes, Principia Philosophiae, IV.ccv, AT VIII-A, p. 327: ‘Sed tamen, ne qua hîc veritati fraus fiat, considerandum est quaedam esse quae habentur certa moraliter, hoc est, quantum sufficit ad usum vitae, quamvis si ad absolutam Dei potentiam referantur, sint incerta.’ (‘It would be disingenous, however, not to point out that some things are considered as morally certain, that is, having sufficient certainty for application to ordinary life, even though they may be uncertain in relation to the absolute power of God.’ CSM I, pp. 289-290.)
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