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17. Marginalia in John Sergeant’s Solid Philosophy (1697)

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Solid Philosophy, pp. [vii-viii]: ‘…they [Descartes and Locke] were forc’d, thro’ their want of Higher Principles, to build all Knowledge, not upon the Things themselves in their Knowing Power, but upon Ideas or Similitudes of them’

Locke: ‘Where is it Mr Locke says Ideas are the similitudes of things he expresly says most of them are not similitudes’

Solid Philosophy, p. [ix]: ‘Mr Locke … would perswade the World that no Man living knows what a Thing or Substance is…’

Locke: ‘Where is it Mr Locke says noe man can tell what a Thing is?’

Solid Philosophy, p. [xxiv]: ‘[The method of Descartes and Locke] is to ground all their Discourses on Ideas; that is, (…) on Similitudes or Resemblances…’

Locke: ‘That is as Mr Locke expresses it the immediate objects of the mind in thinking’

Solid Philosophy, p. [xxxviii]: ‘…a short Passage mention’d by Mr. Locke, Book 4. Chap. 7. §. 17. viz. That he has discours’d with very Rational Men, who have actually Deny’d they were Men.’ [Sergeant repeats this allegation on p. 8; hence Locke’s marginalium]

Locke: ‘vid. etiam p. 8’

Solid Philosophy, pp. [xxxviii-xxxix]: ‘’Tis worth our while to observe the Consonant Effect of the Ideal Way, in the Followers of Cartesius and Mr. Locke, and (in some sort) in both the Authors of those Philosophical Sects themselves: The One UNMANS himself; and the Others Deny themselves to be Men, and yet are Character’d by Mr. L. to be, notwithstanding, very Rational…’

Locke: ‘Truth has forced J.S. to own that Mr Locke did not say that they denyd themselves to be men. And therefor that all this triumph of JS is founded on his misrepresenting of Mr Locke. as may be seen in JS’s Ideae Cartesianae Examinatae p. 33’

Solid Philosophy, p. [xlix]: ‘He [Locke] tells us, B.4.Ch.23. in his Margin, that there is no Abstract Idea of Substance; nor can we (…) by the Sensible Qualities have any Idea of the Substance of Body, more than if we knew nothing at all.’

Locke: ‘When for B 4 one has put book 2 yet I think these words here will not be found in Mr Lockes booke’

Solid Philosophy, p. 8: ‘And, ’tis an excellent Argument to prove the Identity of our Natures, that Mr.L. brings of some Gentlemen he was acquainted with, who deny’d themselves to be Men; and I wonder he would civilly give them the Lye, by patting upon them the Complement that they were notwithstanding very Rational Men; for, were it possible any Man could be a Beast, ’tis most certain these Men were such.’

Locke: ‘vid pr. b. 4 v. p 378

Locke: ‘vid Ideae Cartesanae &tc p 33’

Solid Philosophy, p. 23: ‘…the word IDEA, according to this Author [Locke], signifies a Resemblance, Similitude, or Image…’

Locke: ‘Question: where?’

Solid Philosophy, pp. 35-37: [In ‘Proof 13’ and ‘Proof 14’ Sergeant tries to show that the relation between Lockean ideas and objects is very similar to the relation between scholastic notions and objects (see also the next marginalium).]

Locke: ‘Soe that by these 2 last arguments JS has proved Ideas to be Notions & why then soe much quarrell about the name?’

Solid Philosophy, pp. 37-38: ‘Since then the Ideists must grant that their Ideas are perfecty like that which they know by them, (…) it follows from the Consent of Mankind, that those Ideas must, consequently, be the same with the Things out of the Mind which are known by them; which is what we put our Notions to be. Wherefore, the Notion we have of the Thing, must be the self-same with the Thing known.’

Locke: ‘And soe the good Author has at last proved that his Notions are Likenesses of things’

Solid Philosophy, p. 39: ‘For example, take Gabriel, Peter, Bucephalus, an Oak, a Stone, a Yard, Whiteness, or what other Thing, or Mode of Thing we please; ’tis evident that the Sense of them (which is the same with our Notion of them) does not at all include, hint, or intimate Existence, or Non-Existence.’

Locke: ‘Sense the same with Notion how then does Notion & phantasme differ?’

Solid Philosophy, p. 39: ‘Now, if our Soul, when it knows any Thing has the very nature of that Thing in it, and therefore is intellectually that thing…’

Locke: ‘it should be, has the very thing.

Solid Philosophy, p. 40: ‘…any well instructed Christian who reflects (…) that she [the soul] is made for, or is capable of a Knowledge infinitely higher, viz. the beatifying Sight of GOD…’ [For Sergeant, to know something is to have that thing itself in our soul (instead of an idea of that thing, as Locke would say). According to Locke, Sergeant view implies that if the soul has knowledge of God, it becomes God.]

Locke: ‘It should have been inferred according to what J.S. says in this § by which the soul becomes god.

Solid Philosophy, p. 43: ‘Wherefore, when the Soul knows any thing in Nature she must be that thing as it is Another thing distinct from her; So that in a word, To know is Esse aliud ut aliud; To be another thing, as it is another.’

Locke: ‘i.e. must be that thing as not being that thing’

Solid Philosophy, p. 43: ‘For, they [the natures of bodies] are no Determinations or Modes suitable or belonging to her [the soul’s] Nature as ’tis Spiritual, nor depend Solely on her as on their Subject for their Existence, as all Modes in their Natural Subjects do. Whence follows, that when she knows them, they are purely in her as Extrinsecall to her, or as other Things; and as having their genuin Existence elsewhere, or out of the Mind.’

Locke: ‘i e they are in her as out of her’

Solid Philosophy, p. 59: ‘…that the same thing might have different manners of Existing, and be in our Soul Spiritually, tho’ out of it Corporeally...’

Locke: ‘what is it for a material thing to exist spiritualy?’

Solid Philosophy, p. 61: ‘…Are those Species (…) perfectly like the Thing, or imperfectly? If perfectly like, then they are the same with it, as our Notions are; and so, the Thing it self is in the Soul…’

Locke: ‘I cannot but wonder to hear a man soe often repeat what if he were not a Dictator in philosophie would be Nonsense viz That a like is the same

Solid Philosophy, p. 62: ‘Tho’ I must declare, that I cannot see but that such a Fundamental Point, which influences the whole Body of Science, ought not to be pretermitted.’ [The ‘Fundamental Point’ concerns the nature of ‘ideas and resemblances’ in the human mind, and ‘how they bring us to the Knowledge of the things in nature’.]

Locke: ‘And yet this man of Solid philosophie excuses him self in the next § from makeing this fundamental pointclearly Out’

Solid Philosophy, p. 65: ‘… the Form, called the Soul, did (…) as necessarily follow out of the Disposition of the Matter, (…) as the Form of Fire, or of any other Body in Nature, does out of the Dispositions properly Previous to that Form: And, therfore, does as truly (…) Make or constitute the Man One Thing, as any other Corporeal form does any Body in nature.’

Locke: ‘This I take it makes the soule of a man and the soule of a beast, as to its substance and immateriality just the same.’

Solid Philosophy, p. 66: ‘Therefore there must be some Chief Corporeal Part in Man, which is immediately united with the Soul, as the Matter with its Form, and, therefore, is Primarily Corporeo-Spiritual, and includes both Natures.’

Locke: ‘What is it to be Corporeo-spiritual?’

Solid Philosophy, p. 67: ‘This Part immediately inform’d by the Soul as ’tis Spiritual, (…) must, whatever it is, be of a Temper the most Indifferent to all Bodies, and to their several Modes as can be conceived…’

Locke: ‘Does the form inform but a part of that whereof it is the form?’

Solid Philosophy, p. 75: ‘For, to put Millions of Motions to continue perpetually playing in the Fancy, and (as they needs must) interfering with one another, would destroy all Harmony, and breed a strange jarring Confusion.’ [Sergeant argues that memory can only be explained with the help of imprinted atoms, which remain in the brain and are exited anew whenever the memory is called up. A mere motion of a nerve is not a sufficient explanation, as this motion would soon cease; and if it were constantly repeated, an internal chaos would result. Locke points out that the ‘imprinted atoms’ are not sufficient either; some other instance would be needed to administrate them.]

Locke: ‘And a million of Attoms lyeing by the seat of knowledg twill be as hard to explain what finds out the right one of the thing we would remember’

Solid Philosophy, pp. 75-76: ‘…Reflexion on our past thoughts is the same as Remembrance of them; for we can neither Reflect on a Thing without Remembring it, nor Remember it without Reflecting on it.’

Locke: ‘what’

Solid Philosophy, p. 76: ‘All her [the soul’s] Notions, which are the first Elements of Knowledge, being caus’d in her by those Effluviums, previously to her Knowing either them, or any thing else.’

Locke: ‘And now let the reader consider whether by reading what he finds from §. 6. hither he has not got a perfect clear knowledg how material things get into the immateriall soule.’

Solid Philosophy, p. 117: ‘It is manifest, that we can have Abstract Notions of Existence, Thing, Immaterial, Incorporeal, Knowledge, Will, Operation, &c. that is, we can Consider the Common Subject [Thing] as Existent, Capable of Being, and (if it be a Spirit) as Immaterial, Incorporeal, Knowing, Willing, and Operating, &c. as well as Mathematicians can a Body, as Extended, Round, or Triangular, &c. And then, I would not know why we cannot (…) frame a Science grounded on the Things thus apprehended…’

Locke: ‘Instead of talking thus loosly he had done better to give us a science where in was made out the several sorts of Angels and intelligences with their distinct powers and properties as mathematicians doe the distinct sorts of figures and their properties.’

Solid Philosophy, p. 121 [On Essay, II.i, ‘Of Ideas in general, and their Original’]: ‘I apprehend he [Locke] means, that when we have ideas, we must perceive we have them; because he says afterwards, that the Soul must necessarily be conscious of its own Perception.’

Locke: ‘Were Ideas as he makes his notions p. 63-76 adventitious effluviums lodgd in the brain, we might be said to have those Ideas when we doe not perceive them’

Solid Philosophy, p. 123: [Sergeant argues that it is impossible to know something and to know that we know something at the same time, because the mind can only have one object at a time.]

Locke: ‘His argueing here is to prove that the minde cannot have two objects at once which if true the minde can never have any knowledg which is had only by the compareing 2 Ideas or Notions which are 2 objects. The eye sees and consequently the minde perceives an hundred objects at once though some more and some lesse clearly and distinctly’

Solid Philosophy, p. 124: [Sergeant repeats that ‘Reflex thoughts’ cannot occur at the same time as ‘Direct thoughts’. The time lapse between the two, however, is so short that we are apt to believe that ‘the Reflex Act is experientally known by the very Act it self’. Locke maintains that the thought and our perception of the thought can indeed be simultaneous.]

Locke: ‘A man perceives his thoughts just as he perceives the notes of a tune or sparks of a flint and stone’

Solid Philosophy, pp. 131-132 [On Essay, II.iv, ‘Of Solidity’]: ‘…since the Essence of Quantity is the Commonest Affection of Body, taken in its whole Latitutde, as including all Bodies, it follows, that Continuity, which is its Unity, must be found in them all likewise; that is, all Bodies, or the whole Nature of Body, that is, the Entire Bulk of Body, must be Continued.’

Locke: ‘This argument will as well prove that all men are but one man as it does that all bodys are but one body.’

Solid Philosophy, p. 137 [On Essay, II.viii, ‘Some further Considerations concerning our simple Ideas’]: ‘Nor can I conceive why the Ideas of the Secondary Qualities should have nothing like them, existing in the Bodies themselves; nor be Resemblances of them. If this be true, why are they call’d [Ideas] which either signifies Resemblances, or Nothing?’

Locke: ‘Blewnesse or heat in the minde are the Ideas whether they be like any thing in the object or noe. But he will have Mr Locke to meanresemblances by Ideas, though Mr Locke says expresly that he does not’

Solid Philosophy, p. 200 [On Essay, II.xv ‘Of Duration and Expansion, considered together’]: ‘Lastly, I see not why our Fancy may not extend it self farther than God Exists; that is, (…) gives Being to Creatures; as well as Fancy can extend it self farther than God’s Omnipotency can act.’

Locke: ‘If god exists noe where but where he gives being to creatures by the same reason it will follow that he existed not, before he gave being to creatures the consequence where of is that the Creatures are eternall or god is not.’

Solid Philosophy, pp. 211-212 [On Essay, II.xviii, ‘Of Infinity’]: ‘He [Locke] says, that Nothing is more unconceiveable to him, than Duration, without Succession. What thinks he of the Duration of God, in whom is no Vicissitude, or Shadow of Change, (…) whereas, Succession is essentially perpetual Change?’

Locke: ‘JS al along confound duration with the thing endureing whereas noe body I think will say Duration is god or god is duration’

Solid Philosophy, p. 212: ‘…nothing moves meerly for Motion’s sake; and therefore, that all Motion is, to attain something which is Not-Motion, but the End of it, that is, Rest. Wherefore, Eternal Rest, or that Duration called Eternity, is the End of all the Motion of the whole World…’

Locke: ‘This is to make Duration and motion the same thing which they by noe means are, for things at rest have duration as well as those in motion’

Solid Philosophy, p. 213: ‘But, I must deny that the Perception or Thought, made by Impressions on the Body, by Outward Objects, is to be called Sensation.’

Locke: ‘The place and words where this is said should be quoted’

Solid Philosophy, pp. 220-221 [On Essay, II.xxi, ‘Of Power’]: ‘Beginning then with the Animal part in Man (…) if we consider this Animal, as having now a Rational and Knowing Compart join’d to it, things will be order’d after another manner: For, those Impressions are carry’d farther than the Region of the Brain, even into the Soul it self, which is endow’d with a Faculty of Reflecting upon those her Notions…’

Locke: ‘where dwels the soule beyond the region of the brain?’

Solid Philosophy, p. 224: ‘Both these Motives, Natural and Supernatural, have their several Species or Phantasms beating upon the Seat of Knowledge; with this difference, that the Natural Phantasms, being directly imprinted, are Proper ones; but those Reflex ones, being of Spiritual Natures (…) are Metaphorical and Improper.’

Locke: ‘I thought J.S. had denied al phantasms of spiritual natures and restraind them only to corporeal natures’

Solid Philosophy, pp. 232-233: ‘…How can it be thought [by Locke], that the getting rid of Uneasiness, or (…) the Obtaining of Ease, can be the Formal and Proper Object of the Will (…) It seems to destroy the Acquisition of all Virtue; which is Arduous, and not perform’d but by Contrasting with Ease, and present Satisfactions.’

Locke: ‘Ease is opposed by Mr Locke to uneasinesse and not to action’

Solid Philosophy, p. 239 [On Essay, II.xxiii, ‘Of our Complex Ideas of Substances’]: ‘Wherefore, that I may perform the Duty I owe to Science and Truth, I judge my self obliged first to establish the Literal Truth in this Point; and, next, to satisfie his Scruples and Difficulties.’

Locke: ‘J.S. speaks every where as if Truth and Science had personaly appeard to him and by word of mouth actualy commissiond him to be their sole Defender and Propagater’

Solid Philosophy, p. 241: ‘And ’tis in a manner Equally Impossible not to know what [Capacity] or [Power] means; which are the only Ingredients of [Capable to be,] which is the very formal Conception of Ens, as ’tis precisely Ens; or, of the Thing according to the meer Notion of Substance, taking that Word in a Logical Sense, as ’tis distinguished from Accidents; and not in a Grammatical one (as it were) for a Supporter of the Accidents; for this is a Secondary Sense of [Thing,] and does not signifie what it is in it self, or according to its Primary and precise Notion, as is noted above; but, according to what Respect or Consideratons it bears to others, or other Notions.’

Locke: Al<l> which amounts to noe more but this that Substance is something which is what Mr Locke says’

Solid Philosophy, p. 244: ‘The Conceptions, or Notions of the Modes or Accidents are innumerable; but there is only One which is the Conception of the Thing it self, which we find to be this, that ’tis Capable to be or exist.’

Locke: ‘If the Idea of Substance be Capacity to exist then Accidents are substances for they are capable to exist. If it be as J.S. puts it here and also where a thing capable to Exist, then his Idea of substance or thing, will be this, that a Thing is a thing capable to exist. which as much clears the point as if he should say an is an accident capable to exist. Or a man is a man capable to exist’

Solid Philosophy, pp. 247-248: ‘…he [Locke] objects, that no Reason can be given for the Cohesion of the Parts of Extended Matter. If he means, that we can give no Physical Reason for it, (…) I grant it (…) But, if he thinks there cannot be a far Better and Clearer Reason given from the Supream Science, Metaphysicks, I deny it.’

Locke: ‘The sum of which argument is this we make the word body stand for an Idea of solid parts united togeather or cohering therefor we know what makes those parts cohere.’

Solid Philosophy, p. 248: ‘’Tis not in this Occasion only, but in many others too, that Great Scholars puzzle their Wits to find out Natural Causes for divers Effects, the true Reason for which is only owing to Trans-natural ones, or from these Altissime Causae, which only Metaphysicks give us…’

Locke: ‘Transnatural causes in natural philosophie are not natural causes and consequently supernatural i e immediate effects of divine power apearing out of the course of natural causes and effects a sort of philosophiseing which J.S. very much explodes’

Solid Philosophy, p. 249: ‘The same (…) is the Ground of Mr. Locke’s Perplexity how Extended Parts do cohere; to which, the properest and most Satisfactory Answer is, because there is Quantity in them, which is Essentially Continued; and, so does Formally give Coherence of Parts to Body, its Subject.’

Locke: ‘i e cohere because they doe cohere’

Solid Philosophy, p. 250 (mistakenly printed as p.251): ‘…and then to tell us, that The Idea of Spiritual Natures are as Clear as that of Bodily Substance, which he [Locke] takes such pains to shew is not Clear at all, is, as I conceive, no great Argument for their Clearness, nor their Existence neither; but rather, a strong Argument against both…’

Locke: ‘we may know that they exist though we can not explain all their properties and qualitys’

Solid Philosophy, pp. 253-254 [on Essay, II.xxv, ‘Of Relation’]: ‘…if the Relation be new, or such a one as before was not, there must be some Novelty in the Thing it self to ground it. Whence follows that, if there be such a Real Ground on the one side only, and no Real Ground on the other, there will be a Real Relation on the one side, and no Real Relation on the other, but only a Verbal one, or Extrinsical Denomination; Answering, or (as it were) Chiming Grammatically to the Term which is really Relative, v.g. Our Powers of Seeing of Understanding any thing, have a Real Relation to their proper Objects; both because such Objects Specifie the Power, or make it such a Power, that is, give it its peculiar or distinct Essence; as also, because the Power is by the Object actuated and determin’d to act; that is, the Power is intrinsecally Chang’d, or otherwise than it was, by means of the Object suffers no kind of Change, nor is it at all Alter’d, or otherwise than it was by being known or seen.

Locke: ‘what chang? does the father in the I<n>dies suffer when his son is born in England?’

Solid Philosophy, p. 255 [on Essay, II.xxvi, ‘Of Cause and Effect, and other Relations’]: ‘What I conceive of Causality is, that ’tis the Power of Participating or Communicating some Thing, or some mode of Thing, to the Patient, which was before some way or other, in the Thing that caus’d it…’

Locke: ‘So fire that softens wax and hardens clay had some way or other softness and hardness in it’

Solid Philosophy, p. 255: ‘And hence it is that God, our Creatour, has no Real Relation to his Creatures, tho’ they have many to him; because he is no otherwise, nor better, in the least, by Creating them, than he had been in Case he had not Created any thing at all; and therefore there is no Ground in Him of a Real Correlation to them.’

Locke: ‘Does noething found a real relation but what makes the subject better what thinks he Robber and Robbed. Tormentor and Tormented?’

Solid Philosophy, p. 258 [on Essay, II.xxvii, ‘Of Identity and Diversity’]: ‘Why Mr. Locke, who allows the Complexion of Accidents to constitute the Specifick Nature, should not follow the same Principle, in making a greater Complexion of the Modes Intrinsecally distinguish the Individuum from all others, and so constitute It, I cannot imagin; it being so perfectly Consonant, and necessarily Consequent to his own Doctrine, and agreeable to Evident Principles.’

Locke: ‘What complexion of accidents besides those of place and perhaps time can distinguish two attoms perfectly solid and round and of the same diameter?’

Solid Philosophy, p. 258: ‘And, were it otherwise, so that the Soul were apt to work more perfectly than the Body were able to go along with it; first, that greater Degree of Rationality in the Soul would be lost, and in vain; and next, the Man, God’s Workmanship, would be disproportion’d, and, in a manner, Monstrous in his most Essential Parts. ‘

Locke: ‘How will this doctrine hold in a very witty or rational man who by a knock looses his parts in the strength of his age?’

Solid Philosophy, p. 264: ‘We are indeed to take the Meanings of Words which express our Natural Notions, or Simple Apprehensions, from the Users of them, the Populace; but, the Applying, or Joining those Words or Notions to one another, in order to the framing Thoughts or Judgments of such Connexions, we are to take only from the Learned, or from the Principles belonging to the Sciences that treat of such Subjects, and not at all from the Vulgar…’

Locke: ‘This, if it has any meaning, is that we should take the signification of our words from one sort of man and joyn them by the direction of others. whereas their signification is the only rule and measure of joyneing them’

Solid Philosophy, p. 265: ‘Wherefore the Man, or that Thing which is to be the Knower, must have had Individuality or Personality from other Principles, antecedently to this Knowledge call’d Consciousness; and consequently, he will retain his Identity, or continue the same Man, or (which is equivalent) the same Person, as long as he has those Individuating Principles.’

Locke: ‘A man has the individuality of a man before he has knowledg but is not a person before he has knowledg’

Solid Philosophy, p. 267: ‘Nor is there any farther Mystery in the Word [Self;] for it means no more but our own same Intelligent Individuum, with which we are well acquainted, partly by Direct, partly by Reflex Knowledges.’

Locke: ‘An intelligent individuum is not an intelligent individuum before it has knowledg.’

Solid Philosophy, p. 295 [On Essay, III, ‘Of Words’]: ‘But, till the Best, and only Proper Way (which I mention’d lately) to make Definitions be allow’d and taken, I am sure there will be no new ones made that will deserve that Name…’

Locke: ‘He mentions his as the only proper way to make definitions, let him by examples show that it will doe.’

Solid Philosophy, p. 297: ‘I should be glad to see how one of our new Philosophers would define Motion…’

Locke: ‘This is idlely proposed to Mr Locke who denies that motion can be defind’

Solid Philosophy, p. 305: [When we come to know more about an object, we add more distinct ideas to the confused idea that we already have. It is neither a specifical notion, nor a new Nominal Essence] ‘(for, let us discover so many New Qualities in Gold, every Man will call that Thing Gold still)’

Locke: ‘yes because he in that thing finds his nominal essence of gold’

Solid Philosophy, pp. 317-318 [On Essay, IV.i, ‘Of Knowledge in General’]: ‘Knowledge cannot exist in the Connexion or Disagreement of Ideas. (…) this Connexion of Ideas (…) is that which is signify’d by the Word [Est;] which being so, in this Proposition, [Sugar is sweet,] the Word [Est] must according to him, if only Ideas must be connected, naturally and genuinly affirm, that one of those Ideas is the other Idea, or that the Idea of Sugar is the Idea of Sweet…’

Locke: ‘If the proposition were sugar is sweetnesse it would be false’

Solid Philosophy, p. 319: ‘First, it has been prov’d by many Arguments, that all our Notions are Partial Conceptions of the Thing …’

Locke: ‘Is the notion of a Triangle or of the number 3 a partial conception of the thing?’

Solid Philosophy, p. 320: ‘…we cannot predicate a Concrete of an Abstract, nor an Abstract of a Concrete

Locke: ‘v.g. Haec longitudo illi est aequalis. Ebrietas dedecoret. Is not in these the concrete predicated of the abstract?’

Solid Philosophy, p. 324: ‘Tis not in this occasion only, but in divers others, tho’ I have not always noted them, that Mr.Locke and my self have, without design’d Confederacy, agreed in Positions of great Moment; which, I know not how, have escap’d the Thoughts of all other Authors I have seen.’

Locke: ‘Yes it is easily observable in his book which was published 6 or 7 years after Mr Lockes that it has many things in it very conformable to what Mr Locke had published soe long before.’

Solid Philosophy, p. 327: ‘Whence I cannot see, why he limits Sensitive Knowledge to the Notion of Existence onely; or, that our Senses do make us know onely that a Thing is: For, certainly, our Senses do as well tell us the Wall is white, as that the Wall is…’

Locke: ‘Then I think our senses as much tell us that whiteness exists as that the wall exists’

Solid Philosophy, p. 330: ‘Now, more and less of Divisibility Consider’d, in order to Natural Agents, is the same as to be See Method to Science, B. I. L. 3, §§ 1,2more easily, and less easily Divisible by by those Agents, which we call to be Rare, and Dense.’

Locke: ‘which is rarer quicksilver or steel? and which is the more easily divisible of the two?’

Solid Philosophy, pp. 332-333: ‘That great Pellucidity in the Air is necessarily, and properly refunded into its extream Divisibility, or Rarity; by which it becomes easily penetrable in all its Parts, by those Spicula Ignea, the Rays of the Sun; and Opacity, for the same Reason, is the Proper Effect of Density; which hinders its Subject from being penetrated, or Divided by them; whence also it is a Proper Cause of Repelling, or Reflecting them.’

Locke: ‘v: g which is more dense a diamond or corck? christal or the pouder of Christal? in these and 1000 other instances the more dense is the more pellucid.’

Solid Philosophy, p. 333: ‘…Who sees not that Liquidity, which makes its Subject easily yielding to be flatted evenly, as we see in Ponds; or driven to run in Cavities, by the common Motion of Gravitation, is a proper Effect of Rarity, as Consistency is of Density? Spissitude is a Constipation of Dense Parts, or the Want of Pores to admit the Ingress of other Bodies.’

Locke: ‘what think you of quick silver and a spung?’

Solid Philosophy, p. 337: ‘The Intermediate Colours are made by the Mixture and Demixture of those Extreams; whence, out of the Degrees of their partaking those, Contrary or Subcontrary Qualities are framed, as Blue, Green, Yellow, and all other Colours.’

Locke: ‘which mixtures and demixtures of white and black will never produce a blew a red or an yellow’

Solid Philosophy, pp. 342-343: ‘I pass by the Oddness of the Position, that the Idea, which is a Picture, should be a Picture of it self, or represent it self: I only note, that this Allegation which should clear the Point, quite loses it, and gives it up.’

Locke: ‘may not colours put togeather in figures as phansys the painter make a picture which shall have noe reference to any real being?’

Solid Philosophy, p. 343 [On Essay, IV.iv, ‘Of the Reality of our Knowledge’]: ‘Is not this to make Philosophy not the Knowledge of Things, but of Ideas only; and to pretend, that the Thing must only be held True, if it be Conformable to our Ideas?’

Locke: ‘Things are truly what they are whether we have any Idea of them or noe. But they cannot belong to any ones specific name, unlesse they agree to his specific Idea’

Solid Philosophy, p. 343: ‘…he expresly says, these Complex Ideas are made by the Mind, and not taken from the Thing, not like it…’

Locke: ‘where does he say soe?’

Solid Philosophy, p. 345: ‘For, if he had once his Notions from the Thing, they would be still the Thing in the Mind, and Real, tho’ the Individual Objects, whence they were taken, be perish’d. Nay, more; those Things would have a Better, a more Durable, and more Noble existence in the Mind, than they have in Nature.’

Locke: ‘Then God or angels have a better more dureable and nobler existence in the minde of man than they have in their own actual beings’

Solid Philosophy, p. 346: ‘Thus, when the Hand strikes or wounds a Man, ’tis truly said, that the Man (which signifies the whole Thing) did it, and is answerable for it; and, if he kills the Person he struck, the whole Man will be hang’d for it, tho’ the hand onely, and not the Legs, Head, Neck, &c. gave the Blow.’

Locke: ‘If a man falling from a house strike out another mans eye or brains with his foot is that foot the whole man and shall the whole man be punished for it?’

Solid Philosophy, p. 351: ‘…wherefore they must either prove, by other Grounds, that Similitudes can give us Knowledge of the Things, or they do petere Principium, beg the Question, and prove idem per idem.’

Locke: ‘He argues against Ideas because they are similitudes and yet blames Mr Locke, in many places, for saying they are not similitudes. particularly p. 347’

Solid Philosophy, p. 352: ‘What concerns us is to look at our Principles, and not bot be misled from them, by reflecting on such odd prenatural Productions; as I must think Mr. Locke is, when he thinks Changelings to be something between a Man and a Beast.’

Locke: ‘The author has found a short way to solid philosophie by haveing noe thing to doe that does not agree with our systemes’

Solid Philosophy, pp. 352-353: ‘The Division of Animal into Rational and Irrational is made by such Differences as are perfectly Contradictory to one another; between which there can no more be any Third or Middle, than there can be a Medium between is and is not.’

Locke: ‘Betwixt Rational and irrational there is noe medium but every one admits not the definition of man to be animal rationale’

Solid Philosophy, pp. 356-357: ‘But I must severely reflect on his describing Moral Truths, § 11. to be the Speaking Things according to the Perswasion of our own Mindes, tho’ the Proposition we speak does not agree to the Reality of Things: For, since it is most Evidently known, that the Persuasions of Men’s Mindes not only may, but do frequently contradict one another; by this Definition of Moral Truth both Sides of the Contradiction may be True; which destroys Truth by confounding it with Falshood…’

Locke: ‘Not soe; Because the contradiction here is speaking and not speaking according to the speakers pretension. and soe both sides of the contradiction never be morally true’

Solid Philosophy, p. 360 [On Essay, IV.vi, ‘Of Universal Propositions, their Truth and Certainty’]: ‘We cannot indeed know this [that all men are rational] by the poll: But, if by the word [Man] we mean no more but a Rational Animal, it is so far from Impossible to know, and affirm that All Men are Rational, that ’tis Impossible not to know it.’

Locke: ‘without doubt he that knows what he makes the word man stand for knows what he makes it stand for’

Solid Philosophy, p. 363 [On Essay, IV.vii, ‘Of Maxims’]: ‘Knowledge may be either consider’d, as instill’d by insensible Degrees, into Infants, or the Ruder Sort; or, as Reducible to the clearest Grounds, by Men of Art. Now, I cannot think that Mr. Locke imagins, that we, or any Man, hold that Maxims were meant for Infants, of the Vulgar…’

Locke: ‘knowledg then it seems was not meant for infantes or the vulgar’

Solid Philosophy, p. 365: ‘But, should any Sceptick ask why the Idea of Yellow is the Idea of Yellow? (…) it would not look so extravagant to answer, because Every thing is what it is: And, I believe, Nature would force Mr. Locke, or any other to give this for his Reason. In like manner, should he ask why a Man is a Man? It would look preter-natural to answer, because a Tree is a Tree, Whereas, it would look very natural to answer, because Every Thing is it Self, or, is what it is.’

Locke: ‘There is noe reason to be given of any of these propositions for they are all self evident, and soe uncapeable to be made clearer or certainer’

Solid Philosophy, p. 366: ‘…Let Mr. Locke tell a Sceptick, that Yellow is Yellow, and not blue; he may answer, that he will yield to neither Proposition; because, Yellow and Blue are Species of Colour, and (according to Mr. Locke’s Grounds) he knows not the distinct Bounds, or precise Extent of neither of them; and therefore, should he grant it, he must assent to he knows not what.’

Locke: ‘Where is it Mr Locke says soe of simple Ideas’

Solid Philosophy, p. 367: [Sergeant argues that general notions are clearer than particular notions. Hence a sceptic, who doubts that yellow is yellow, can be cured by the use of the more general proposition the same is the same with it self.]

Locke: ‘According to this argument (if it were true that general Ideas were the clearest) the general maximes would be of noe use to prove that yellow is yellow, for all his doubts about what is yellow would (if that were anything material) be still the same.’

Solid Philosophy, pp. 368-369: [Sergeant refers to Locke’s comment that maxims can be useful to ‘stop the Mouths of Wranglers’] ‘…For, Whence could they have this strange Virtue to stop the Mouths of such Unreasonable Men, but because their Evidence is Greater than any others, or than Particular Self-evident Propositions are?’

Locke: ‘Not because their evidence is greater than any more particular self evident proposition but because serveing in all cases they are more inculcated and used than the other’

Solid Philosophy, p. 368: ‘He [Locke] seems to mislike the Procedure by Praecognita and Praeconcessa; whereas, his Acute Wit will find, upon Reflexion, that it is impossible we can make an Ordinary, much less any Speculative, Discourse, but the Discoursers must agree in something that is either Foreknown, or (at least) Foregranted, for, if the two Disputants disagree in all their Principles and Grounds, and one of them still denies ALL the other affirms, ’tis impossible they should Discourse together at all.’

Locke [referring to the word ‘Discoursers’]: ‘He means Disputants. but Mr L speaks not of Disputation but Knowledg’

Solid Philosophy, p. 369: [Sergeant insists on the Absolute Necessity of the two Maxims: 1. Everything must necessarily be what it is 2. A thing cannot be and not be at the same time.] ‘To apprehend more clearly the Usefulness of these two Principles, let us suppose a Man quite Devested of them, and to have neither of them in his Judgment, and then reflect what he is good for.’

Locke: ‘A man divested i e quite bereft or incapable of knowing them to be true is incapable of all knowledg for he is incapable of knowing the same to be the same and different Ideas to be different. But the same would happen to one that knows not that a Mangastan is a Mangastan and not a Turnep.’

Solid Philosophy, p. 370: ‘Every particular Body in the World must be in some place.’

Locke: ‘According to this Maxim of our Author in What place is the Soule or an Angel by his doctrin’

Solid Philosophy, p. 372: ‘Whereas only the Definition, by explicating the true Essence of a Thing, shews us Distinctly the true Spiritual Notion of it.’

Locke: ‘Where are these definitions that explicate the true Essences of things? and (excepting mathematical) how many of them has J.S.? He would obleig the world by a list of them if it were of noe more but those things he has talked of in his books and pretends to know’

Solid Philosophy, p. 374: ‘…yet, if I, mistaking, or not mistaking, have such a Meaning of it [of a word] in my Mind, (…) that Meaning is truly in me: Nor, tho’ I be rectify’d as to the Common Use of that Word, and put another Name to it; yet my Meaning, whether properly or improperly signify’d, is still indivisibly and unalterably the same.’

Locke: ‘He that has a meaning to any word has it no doubt whilst he has it: But he that varys the meaning of his terms or knows not precisely what he means by them (as noe thing is more ordinary) fils his discourse with obscure and confused Ideas’

Solid Philosophy, p. 374: ‘If, then, he only means, that the Mis-application or Abuse of them does great Harm, he magnifies General Maxims, while he intended to disparage them; For, it is generally noted, that those are the Best Things, that, Mis-us’d, do the Greatest Harm. By this Argument, we must lay aside all Religion, as well as General Maxims; since, not all the Things in the World, put together, have done so great Mischief, as Mis-us’d Religion…’

Locke: ‘Who says they should be laid aside?’

Solid Philosophy, pp. 375-376 [On Essay, IV.viii, ‘Of Trifling Propositions’]: ‘…Matter alone, since it is a meer Power to be another Thing, being, of its own Notion, utterly Indeterminate, (which is the true Sense of Aristotle’s Description of it,) is not capable of Existing, or a Thing…’

Locke: ‘Matter is a solid substance and not a power. Here J.S. falls under the same rebuke which he bestows on Mr Locke for a misunderstood expression and not for any mistake in his meaning for that by body he means an extended solid substance and not modes of Extension and Solidity without substance may be seen B.II.C XIII § 12. B III C. X §. 15Though argueing against Cartes’s use of the word Body he thought it sufficient to mention those modes which in the proper use of the word Body are different from that sole Mode which Des Cartes uses it for, without mentioning of Substance. And therefor to use his own expression Meer power is noe more the Notion of matter than an Hors-shoe is a pancake’

Solid Philosophy, p. 376: ‘How Mr.Locke comes not to treat of Matter in his whole Book, I know not…’

Locke: ‘I desire him to look into B. III C: X. § 15’

Solid Philosophy, p. 377-378: ‘But, I absolutely deny that any Man can possibly have the true and distinct Notion of Man, unless he conceives him to be Rational. As for what he tells us, he has discours’d with very Rational Men, who have actually deny’d they are Men…’

Locke: ‘v. p. 8’

Solid Philosophy, p. 380: ‘But, I shall be briefer here upon this Subject, having demonstrated in my Method, Book 2. Less. 2, and 3. by many Arguments, which, I am very confident, are Unanswerable, that all First Principles must be Identical Propositions: Whence, either those Arguments must be shewn Invalid, or it must be forcibly deny’d by him that there are any First Principles at all…’

Locke: ‘Corpus est quantum. Aequalia alicui tertio sunt aequalia inter se instanced by JS in the place quoted are not Identical propositions’

Solid Philosophy, pp. 380-381: ‘We may speak of (…) all other Considerations or Notions of the Thing (…) and ’tis a hard Case if we may not be allow’d to say something of the Metaphysical Verity of the Thing (…) And, if we may say any thing of it, I defie all Mankind to shew me, that that Saying can be any other but an Identical Proposition.’

Locke: ‘An Identical proposition is the affirming the very same term of it self.’

Solid Philosophy, p. 382: [Identical propositions are the first and most evident truths. That is why educated as well as uneducated men…] ‘…make them the Ultimate Ressort of all their Persuasions, and endeavour to Reduce and Resolve all their other Knowledges into them.’

Locke: ‘Knowledg has its bottom only in the perception of the agreement or diversity of any two Ideas and is neither founded on nor can be reduced to Identical propositions’

Solid Philosophy, pp. 388-389: [On Essay, IV.ix, ‘Of our Knowledge of Existence’]: ‘This Excellent Author discourses very Solidly, when he says, that Universal Propositions, of which we can have certain Knowledge, do not concern Existence. (…) But, when he says that such Propositions do not concern Existence, he means (I suppose) Existence in Nature, or our of the Mind; (or else not at all;)…’

Locke: ‘An ingeneous man that had read Ch: IX could have made noe such question what Mr Locke there meant.’

Solid Philosophy, pp. 390-391: [On Essay, IV.x, ‘Of our Knowledge of the Existence of a God’]: ‘He will say that, tho’ it [incogitative matter] could not do this [produce Thought] of it self, yet God could make it do so. But if God cannot contradict himself (…), then, since [he] (…) has Establisht each kind of Nature to be it self and no other; then, to put in God a Power to confound those Natures again, (…) is to put a Power in God to do Contradictions, that is, to do Impossibilities…’

Locke: ‘This is to suppose that god hath not given cogitation to any parts of matter and thence to conclude he cannot. But the proof must begin at the other end’

Solid Philosophy, p. 392: [Sergeant claims that Locke’s ‘Philosophizing by Ideas’ hinders him to make a clear divison between Corporeal and Spiritual Natures.]

Locke: ‘Mr Locke’s way puts an externall difference between material and immaterial. But that all thinking things are immaterial is supposed only and must be provd, and till that be donne what Mr Locke has said may be true how much so ever it may dis…. any received hypothesis’

Solid Philosophy, p. 395: [According to Locke, we cannot rule out the possibility that animals are endowed with reason. Sergeant concludes that this leads to dire consequences.] ‘One, That the Nature of Man and Brute are confounded; since all those Chief Operations Proper to Man, are Communicable to Brutes.’

Locke: ‘If he will read again and consider what Mr Locke has said in the case he will find them not confounded.’

Solid Philosophy, p. 395: ‘…his [Locke’s] way of Ideas will be conceiv’d to be meerly Phantastick and Unphilosophical; being most unlike the Ideas in the Divine Understanding, the Original Ground of all Truth…’

Locke: ‘J.S: speak here as if he knew the Ideas in the divine understanding. I wish he would tell us how he comes to know them, for I fear in this matter he makes god like unto himself and measures the Divine understanding by his own’

Solid Philosophy, p. 399 [On Essay, IV.iv]: ‘The 11th Chapter [of Locke’s Essay] treats Of our knowledge of the Existence of other Things; by which words he means, other Things than our selves. He seems to ground his Discourse on this Position, that no particular Man can know the Existence of any other Being, but only when, by Actually operating on him, it makes it self perceive’d by him…’

Locke: ‘Mr Locke haveing before spoke of our knowledg of the Existence of our selves and of god J.S interprets other things here very strangly’

Solid Philosophy, pp. 399-400: ‘But, why we may not gather by our Reason, the Existence of Spiritual Beings, or Angels (…) from some Operation on other Things in Nature that can onely proceed from them, I cannot discern…’

Locke: ‘Gathering by Reason unlesse it amount to demonstration produces not knowledg but beleif.’

Solid Philosophy, p. 401: ‘…when we are ripe for more express Knowledges, those Impressions made by one of our own Parts upon others, do not cause in use the Notion of Existence, (…) because we know already, and before-hand, that we do exist; But, put case we did not, would not these Impressions make us know by Sensation our own Existence, as well as that of any other Body whatever?’

Locke: ‘A man may see his hand and there by know that a hand exists but tis not there by that he knows his own existence’

Solid Philosophy, pp. 405-406 [On Essay, IV.xii, ‘Of the Improvement of our Knowledge’]: [Sergeant on] ‘Mr Locke’s main Principle (…) All Knowledge of the Certainty of Principles, and consequently, the Way to improve our Knowledge, is, to get, and fix in our Minds, Clear, Distinct and Compleat Ideas, as far as they are to be had, and annex to them Proper and Constant Names. (…) to embrace this Principle, we must be oblig’d to quit all our Self-evident Maxims, as of little Use, upon which our selves, and all the Learned part of the World, have proceeded hitherto.’

Locke: ‘who is it obleiges him to quit them?’

Solid Philosophy, p. 407: ‘But, where shall we find any Sect of Philosophers, who, for want of Exact Skill in Logick and Metaphysics, are not forc’d to build upon Hypotheses, (and those generally False ones too;) but our Anti-Ideists, whom I take to be true Followers of Aristotle, in his main Principles, and the only true Understanders of his Doctrine.’

Locke: ‘Here the good gent: himself falls into the same fault which he condems in me p. 404 for adviseing to beware what principles one takes’

Solid Philosophy, p. 410 [On Essay, IV.xiv, ‘Of Judgment’]: ‘The former [Outward Action] does (generally) concern the External Conveniences or Necessities of our Temporal Life here; the Later [Inward Assent], the Interiour and Natural Perfection of our Soul; which is the Adhering to Truth, and rejecting of Errour.’

Locke: ‘I thought that outward actions had concerned our future eternal state too’

Solid Philosophy, p. 413: ‘But, how does this agree with his Contradistinguishing formerly [Judgement,] according to its whole Latitude, or in its General Notion, from Knowledge; unless we should say, that we only do right when we judge at Hap-hazard, or judge Right by Chance.’

Locke: ‘Very well for knowledg is seeing the thing to be soe. Judgment when right is assent to a true proposition without certainly knowing it to be true’

Solid Philosophy, p. 414: ‘Cannot we suspend our Judgement till Evidence appears?’

Locke: ‘Judgment Mr S: says may be suspended. then it is not knowledg for that cannot be suspended’

Solid Philosophy, p. 414: ‘May we not judge a Conclusion that is Demonstrated to be True, because it is Demonstrated?’

Locke: ‘Noe, we see it to be true if we see the demonstration and doe not judg’

Solid Philosophy, p. 418 [On Essay, IV.xvi, ‘Of the Degrees of Assent’]: ‘To Assent to any Truth, … is to say interiourly, the Thing [is;] and to Dissent, is to say the Thing [is; not.]

Locke: ‘To assent I take it is to say I beleive a thing to be ’

Solid Philosophy, p. 431 [On Essay, IV.xvii, ‘Of Reason’]: [On the use of syllogisms.] ‘Certainly, the seeing the middle Term placed in the middle, as it ought, will make a Reflecting Man see better the Connexion of the Terms; whence, besides its own aptness to connect, it comes, even by vertue of its place, to be seen to be Immediate to each of the Extremes…’

Locke: ‘as in the syllogisms of the Schools it is not’

Solid Philosophy, pp. 434-434: [Sergeant agrees with Locke that syllogisms are of no use in ‘Probable Discourses’.] ‘For Syllogism shows an Infallibly-Certain way of Concluding; whence nothing can bear that Test but what does conclude; Whereas Probabilities being grounded on Common Mediums, do not conclude at all; and therefore it would do Probability a Great Disservice to bring it to the Touchstone of all True or Conclusive Reasoning, a Syllogistick Form.’

Locke: ‘what becomes then of all his Master Aristotles pains about topical arguments’

Solid Philosophy, p. 435: ‘But why he [Locke] should think it [syllogistic reasoning] does not serve to increase Knowledge, is a strange Riddel; the whole Design of Artificial, or Syllogistick, Reasoning being to Deduce Conclusions not yet known, from Premises which, are either perfectly Foreknown, or at least better known.’

Locke: ‘Syllogisme is to shew the rectitude of what we have inferd if there be a doubt of it but does not help us to finde the Medius terminus by virtue of which we doe infer.’

Solid Philosophy, p. 437: ‘…this Acute Author [Locke] fancies Unintelligible Mysteries in the Annexing Words to his Ideas. (…) [I] cannot discern any Annexion other than this, that Men have agreed that such Words, shall signify such and such Things or Notions; all other Annexion being Unaccountable.’

Locke: ‘They have either not agreed or doe not keep to that agreement?’

Solid Philosophy, p. 439 [On Essay, IV.xviii, ‘Of Faith and Reason, and their distinct Provinces’]: ‘I grant too, that Revelation cannot be admitted against clear Evidence of Reason. I wish, that instead of the word [Revelation] he had rather said [Pretence of Revelation] for, otherwise, some Readers may hap to take his words in a Dis-edifying sense; as if it were a possible Case, that Revelation it self may be supposed to be opposit to Clear Evidence of Reason…’

Locke: ‘I perceive that J.S argues from the summarys by the sides. but Mr Locke’s words in the text § 5 are that noe proposition can be received for divine revelation if it be contrary to our clear intuitive knowledg

Solid Philosophy, p. 448 [On Essay, IV.xx, ‘Of wrong Assent, or Errour’]: ‘...that all Errour or Wrong Assent, does onely Spring from Assenting at all upon Probable Motives. For did they [Men] Assent onely upon Evidence, it is Impossible they should ever erre; since Evidence for an Errour is in it self impossible.’

Locke: ‘soe that a man is to be a sceptic in all where he has not demonstration’

Solid Philosophy, p. 449: [Why people may take wrong measures of probabilities.] ‘All these are so many Remora’s to the Advancement of Science, and Motes in our Intellectual Eye, hindring it from seeing Evident Truth. Yet, none of them, but has some kind of Probability, (as the World goes;) or, at least, will furnish Men with probable Arguments: For, a very slight Thing serves to make a Thing Probable.’

Locke: ‘A very slight thing will not serve to make a thing probable because the account must be cast up on both sides to shew the ballance’

Solid Philosophy, p. 450: ‘…Man’s true Nature, which is Rational, is to be rated according to the Conformity we ought to conceive it had from the Idea of it in the Divine Understanding, its true Essence; where none can doubt but it was Perfect, till it came to be slubber’d and sully’d by the tampering of Second Causes, and their Never-uniform Circumstances.’

Locke: ‘There are then it seems Ideas in gods understanding.’

Solid Philosophy, p. 457: ‘The Lowest of our Notions in that Line, which are in any degree Common or General, is that of Homo; which treats of Human Nature, of its Operations proper to Man, as Man…’

Locke: ‘And why not Elephas as well as homo’

Solid Philosophy, pp. 456-457 [On Essay, IV.xxi, ‘Of the Division of the Sciences’]: [Sergeant defends] ‘the Connatural way how Sciences are to be Divided (…) The immediate Notion under Ens is Corpus; and this is the Object of Natural Philosophy. (…) The Lowest of our Notions in that Line, which are in any degree Common or General, is that of Homo; which treats of Humane Nature, of its Operations proper to Man, as Man; and Chiefly of his Primary Operation Reasoning; and then, the Science which shows how to order those Operations right that belong to his Understanding…’

Locke: ‘ How does the understanding which is denyd to belong to body come under the Notion of body’

Diplomatic

Solid Philosophy, pp. [vii-viii]: ‘…they [Descartes and Locke] were forc’d, thro’ their want of Higher Principles, to build all Knowledge, not upon the Things themselves in their Knowing Power, but upon Ideas or Similitudes of them’

Locke: ‘Where is it Mr Locke says Ideas are the similitudes of things he expresly says most of them are not similitudes’

Solid Philosophy, p. [ix]: ‘Mr Locke … would perswade the World that no Man living knows what a Thing or Substance is…’

Locke: ‘Where is it Mr Locke says noe man can tell what a Thing is?’

Solid Philosophy, p. [xxiv]: ‘[The method of Descartes and Locke] is to ground all their Discourses on Ideas; that is, (…) on Similitudes or Resemblances…’

Locke: ‘That is as Mr Locke expresses it the immediate objects of the mind in thinking’

Solid Philosophy, p. [xxxviii]: ‘…a short Passage mention’d by Mr. Locke, Book 4. Chap. 7. §. 17. viz. That he has discours’d with very Rational Men, who have actually Deny’d they were Men.’ [Sergeant repeats this allegation on p. 8; hence Locke’s marginalium]

Locke: ‘vid. etiam p. 8’

Solid Philosophy, pp. [xxxviii-xxxix]: ‘’Tis worth our while to observe the Consonant Effect of the Ideal Way, in the Followers of Cartesius and Mr. Locke, and (in some sort) in both the Authors of those Philosophical Sects themselves: The One UNMANS himself; and the Others Deny themselves to be Men, and yet are Character’d by Mr. L. to be, notwithstanding, very Rational…’

Locke: ‘Truth has forced J.S. to own that Mr Locke did not say that they denyd themselves to be men. And therefor that all this triumph of JS is founded on his misrepresenting of Mr Locke. as may be seen in JS’s Ideae Cartesianae Examinatae p. 33’

Solid Philosophy, p. [xlix]: ‘He [Locke] tells us, B.4.Ch.23. in his Margin, that there is no Abstract Idea of Substance; nor can we (…) by the Sensible Qualities have any Idea of the Substance of Body, more than if we knew nothing at all.’

Locke: ‘When for B 4 one has put book 2 yet I think these words here will not be found in Mr Lockes booke’

Solid Philosophy, p. 8: ‘And, ’tis an excellent Argument to prove the Identity of our Natures, that Mr.L. brings of some Gentlemen he was acquainted with, who deny’d themselves to be Men; and I wonder he would civilly give them the Lye, by patting upon them the Complement that they were notwithstanding very Rational Men; for, were it possible any Man could be a Beast, ’tis most certain these Men were such.’

Locke: ‘vid pr. b. 4 v. p 378’

Locke: ‘vid Ideae Cartesanae &tc p 33’

Solid Philosophy, p. 23: ‘…the word IDEA, according to this Author [Locke], signifies a Resemblance, Similitude, or Image…’

Locke: ‘Question: where?’

Solid Philosophy, pp. 35-37: [In ‘Proof 13’ and ‘Proof 14’ Sergeant tries to show that the relation between Lockean ideas and objects is very similar to the relation between scholastic notions and objects (see also the next marginalium).]

Locke: ‘Soe that by these 2 last arguments JS has proved Ideas to be Notions & why then soe much quarrell about the name?’

Solid Philosophy, pp. 37-38: ‘Since then the Ideists must grant that their Ideas are perfecty like that which they know by them, (…) it follows from the Consent of Mankind, that those Ideas must, consequently, be the same with the Things out of the Mind which are known by them; which is what we put our Notions to be. Wherefore, the Notion we have of the Thing, must be the self-same with the Thing known.’

Locke: ‘And soe the good Author has at last proved that his Notions are Likenesses of things’

Solid Philosophy, p. 39: ‘For example, take Gabriel, Peter, Bucephalus, an Oak, a Stone, a Yard, Whiteness, or what other Thing, or Mode of Thing we please; ’tis evident that the Sense of them (which is the same with our Notion of them) does not at all include, hint, or intimate Existence, or Non-Existence.’

Locke: ‘Sense the same with Notion how then does Notion & phantasme differ?’

Solid Philosophy, p. 39: ‘Now, if our Soul, when it knows any Thing has the very nature of that Thing in it, and therefore is intellectually that thing…’

Locke: ‘it should be, has the very thing.

Solid Philosophy, p. 40: ‘…any well instructed Christian who reflects (…) that she [the soul] is made for, or is capable of a Knowledge infinitely higher, viz. the beatifying Sight of GOD…’ [For Sergeant, to know something is to have that thing itself in our soul (instead of an idea of that thing, as Locke would say). According to Locke, Sergeant view implies that if the soul has knowledge of God, it becomes God.]

Locke: ‘It should have been inferred according to what J.S. says in this § by which the soul becomes god.

Solid Philosophy, p. 43: ‘Wherefore, when the Soul knows any thing in Nature she must be that thing as it is Another thing distinct from her; So that in a word, To know is Esse aliud ut aliud; To be another thing, as it is another.’

Locke: ‘i.e. must be that things as not being that thing’

Solid Philosophy, p. 43: ‘For, they [the natures of bodies] are no Determinations or Modes suitable or belonging to her [the soul’s] Nature as ’tis Spiritual, nor depend Solely on her as on their Subject for their Existence, as all Modes in their Natural Subjects do. Whence follows, that when she knows them, they are purely in her as Extrinsecall to her, or as other Things; and as having their genuin Existence elsewhere, or out of the Mind.’

Locke: ‘i e they are in her as out of her’

Solid Philosophy, p. 59: ‘…that the same thing might have different manners of Existing, and be in our Soul Spiritually, tho’ out of it Corporeally...’

Locke: ‘what is it for a material thing to exist spiritualy?’

Solid Philosophy, p. 61: ‘…Are those Species (…) perfectly like the Thing, or imperfectly? If perfectly like, then they are the same with it, as our Notions are; and so, the Thing it self is in the Soul…’

Locke: ‘I cannot but wonder to hear a man soe often repeat what if he were not a Dictator in philosophie would be Nonsense viz That a like is the same

Solid Philosophy, p. 62: ‘Tho’ I must declare, that I cannot see but that such a Fundamental Point, which influences the whole Body of Science, ought not to be pretermitted.’ [The ‘Fundamental Point’ concerns the nature of ‘ideas and resemblances’ in the human mind, and ‘how they bring us to the Knowledge of the things in nature’.]

Locke: ‘And yet this man of Solid philosophie excuses him self in the next § from makeing this fundamental pointclearly Out’

Solid Philosophy, p. 65: ‘… the Form, called the Soul, did (…) as necessarily follow out of the Disposition of the Matter, (…) as the Form of Fire, or of any other Body in Nature, does out of the Dispositions properly Previous to that Form: And, therfore, does as truly (…) Make or constitute the Man One Thing, as any other Corporeal form does any Body in nature.’

Locke: ‘This I take it makes the soule of a man and the soule of a beast, as to its substance and immateriality just the same.’

Solid Philosophy, p. 66: ‘Therefore there must be some Chief Corporeal Part in Man, which is immediately united with the Soul, as the Matter with its Form, and, therefore, is Primarily Corporeo-Spiritual, and includes both Natures.’

Locke: ‘What is it to be Corporeo-spiritual?’

Solid Philosophy, p. 67: ‘This Part immediately inform’d by the Soul as ’tis Spiritual, (…) must, whatever it is, be of a Temper the most Indifferent to all Bodies, and to their several Modes as can be conceived…’

Locke: ‘Does the form inform but a part of that whereof it is the form?’

Solid Philosophy, p. 75: ‘For, to put Millions of Motions to continue perpetually playing in the Fancy, and (as they needs must) interfering with one another, would destroy all Harmony, and breed a strange jarring Confusion.’ [Sergeant argues that memory can only be explained with the help of imprinted atoms, which remain in the brain and are exited anew whenever the memory is called up. A mere motion of a nerve is not a sufficient explanation, as this motion would soon cease; and if it were constantly repeated, an internal chaos would result. Locke points out that the ‘imprinted atoms’ are not sufficient either; some other instance would be needed to administrate them.]

Locke: ‘And a million of Attoms lyeing by the seat of knowledg twill be as hard to explain what finds out the right one of the thing we would remember’

Solid Philosophy, pp. 75-76: ‘…Reflexion on our past thoughts is the same as Remembrance of them; for we can neither Reflect on a Thing without Remembring it, nor Remember it without Reflecting on it.’

Locke: ‘what

Solid Philosophy, p. 76: ‘All her [the soul’s] Notions, which are the first Elements of Knowledge, being caus’d in her by those Effluviums, previously to her Knowing either them, or any thing else.’

Locke: ‘And now let the reader consider whether by reading what he finds from §. 6. hither he has not got a perfect clear knowledg how material things get into the immateriall soule.’

Solid Philosophy, p. 117: ‘It is manifest, that we can have Abstract Notions of Existence, Thing, Immaterial, Incorporeal, Knowledge, Will, Operation, &c. that is, we can Consider the Common Subject [Thing] as Existent, Capable of Being, and (if it be a Spirit) as Immaterial, Incorporeal, Knowing, Willing, and Operating, &c. as well as Mathematicians can a Body, as Extended, Round, or Triangular, &c. And then, I would not know why we cannot (…) frame a Science grounded on the Things thus apprehended…’

Locke: ‘Instead of talking thus loosly he had done better to give us a science where in was made out the several sorts of Angels and intelligences with their distinct powers and properties as mathematicians doe the distinct sorts of figures and their properties.’

Solid Philosophy, p. 121 [On Essay, II.i, ‘Of Ideas in general, and their Original’]: ‘I apprehend he [Locke] means, that when we have ideas, we must perceive we have them; because he says afterwards, that the Soul must necessarily be conscious of its own Perception.’

Locke: ‘Were Ideas as he makes his notions. p. 63-76 adventitious effluviums lodgd in the brain, we might be said to have those Ideas when we doe not perceive them’

Solid Philosophy, p. 123: [Sergeant argues that it is impossible to know something and to know that we know something at the same time, because the mind can only have one object at a time.]

Locke: ‘His argueing here is to prove that the minde cannot have two objects at once which if true the minde can never have any knowledg which is had only by the compareing 2 Ideas or Notions which are 2 objects. The eye sees and consequently the minde perceives an hundred objects at once though some more and some lesse clearly and distinctly’

Solid Philosophy, p. 124: [Sergeant repeats that ‘Reflex thoughts’ cannot occur at the same time as ‘Direct thoughts’. The time lapse between the two, however, is so short that we are apt to believe that ‘the Reflex Act is experientally known by the very Act it self’. Locke maintains that the thought and our perception of the thought can indeed be simultaneous.]

Locke: ‘A man perceives his thoughts just as he perceives the notes of a tune or sparks of a flint and stone

Solid Philosophy, pp. 131-132 [On Essay, II.iv, ‘Of Solidity’]: ‘…since the Essence of Quantity is the Commonest Affection of Body, taken in its whole Latitutde, as including all Bodies, it follows, that Continuity, which is its Unity, must be found in them all likewise; that is, all Bodies, or the whole Nature of Body, that is, the Entire Bulk of Body, must be Continued.’

Locke: ‘This argument will as well prove that all men are but one man as it does that all bodys are but one body.’

Solid Philosophy, p. 137 [On Essay, II.viii, ‘Some further Considerations concerning our simple Ideas’]: ‘Nor can I conceive why the Ideas of the Secondary Qualities should have nothing like them, existing in the Bodies themselves; nor be Resemblances of them. If this be true, why are they call’d [Ideas] which either signifies Resemblances, or Nothing?’

Locke: ‘Blewnesse or heat in the minde are the Ideas th.. whether they be like any thing in the object or noe. But he will have Mr Locke to meanresemblances by Ideas, though Mr Locke says expresly that he does not’

Solid Philosophy, p. 200 [On Essay, II.xv ‘Of Duration and Expansion, considered together’]: ‘Lastly, I see not why our Fancy may not extend it self farther than God Exists; that is, (…) gives Being to Creatures; as well as Fancy can extend it self farther than God’s Omnipotency can act.’

Locke: ‘If god exists noe where but where he gives being to creatures by the same reason it will follow that he existed not, before he gave being to creatures the consequence where of is that the Creatures are eternall or god is not.’

Solid Philosophy, pp. 211-212 [On Essay, II.xviii, ‘Of Infinity’]: ‘He [Locke] says, that Nothing is more unconceiveable to him, than Duration, without Succession. What thinks he of the Duration of God, in whom is no Vicissitude, or Shadow of Change, (…) whereas, Succession is essentially perpetual Change?’

Locke: ‘JS al along confound duration with the thing endureing whereas . noe body I think will say Duration is god or god is duration’

Solid Philosophy, p. 212: ‘…nothing moves meerly for Motion’s sake; and therefore, that all Motion is, to attain something which is Not-Motion, but the End of it, that is, Rest. Wherefore, Eternal Rest, or that Duration called Eternity, is the End of all the Motion of the whole World…’

Locke: ‘This is to make Duration and motion the same thing which they by noe means are, for things at rest have duration as well as those in motion’

Solid Philosophy, p. 213: ‘But, I must deny that the Perception or Thought, made by Impressions on the Body, by Outward Objects, is to be called Sensation.’

Locke: ‘The place and words where this is said should be quoted’

Solid Philosophy, pp. 220-221 [On Essay, II.xxi, ‘Of Power’]: ‘Beginning then with the Animal part in Man (…) if we consider this Animal, as having now a Rational and Knowing Compart join’d to it, things will be order’d after another manner: For, those Impressions are carry’d farther than the Region of the Brain, even into the Soul it self, which is endow’d with a Faculty of Reflecting upon those her Notions…’

Locke: ‘where dwels the soule beyond the region of the brain?’

Solid Philosophy, p. 224: ‘Both these Motives, Natural and Supernatural, have their several Species or Phantasms beating upon the Seat of Knowledge; with this difference, that the Natural Phantasms, being directly imprinted, are Proper ones; but those Reflex ones, being of Spiritual Natures (…) are Metaphorical and Improper.’

Locke: ‘I thought J.S. had denied al phantasms of spiritual natures and restraind them only to corporeal natures’

Solid Philosophy, pp. 232-233: ‘…How can it be thought [by Locke], that the getting rid of Uneasiness, or (…) the Obtaining of Ease, can be the Formal and Proper Object of the Will (…) It seems to destroy the Acquisition of all Virtue; which is Arduous, and not perform’d but by Contrasting with Ease, and present Satisfactions.’

Locke: ‘Ease is opposed by Mr Locke to uneasinesse and not to action’

Solid Philosophy, p. 239 [On Essay, II.xxiii, ‘Of our Complex Ideas of Substances’]: ‘Wherefore, that I may perform the Duty I owe to Science and Truth, I judge my self obliged first to establish the Literal Truth in this Point; and, next, to satisfie his Scruples and Difficulties.’

Locke: ‘J.S. speaks every where as if Truth and Science had personaly appeard to him and by word of mouth actualy commissiond him to be their sole Defender and Propagater’

Solid Philosophy, p. 241: ‘And ’tis in a manner Equally Impossible not to know what [Capacity] or [Power] means; which are the only Ingredients of [Capable to be,] which is the very formal Conception of Ens, as ’tis precisely Ens; or, of the Thing according to the meer Notion of Substance, taking that Word in a Logical Sense, as ’tis distinguished from Accidents; and not in a Grammatical one (as it were) for a Supporter of the Accidents; for this is a Secondary Sense of [Thing,] and does not signifie what it is in it self, or according to its Primary and precise Notion, as is noted above; but, according to what Respect or Consideratons it bears to others, or other Notions.’

Locke: Al<l> which amounts to noe more but this that Substance is something which is what Mr Locke says’

Solid Philosophy, p. 244: ‘The Conceptions, or Notions of the Modes or Accidents are innumerable; but there is only One which is the Conception of the Thing it self, which we find to be this, that ’tis Capable to be or exist.’

Locke: ‘If the Idea of Substance be Capacity to exist then Accidents are substances for they are capable to exist. If it be as J.S. puts it here and also where a thing capable to Exist, then his Idea of substance or thing, will be this, that a Thing is a thing capable to exist. which as much clears the point as if he should say an is an accident capable to exist. Or a man is a man capable to exist’

Solid Philosophy, pp. 247-248: ‘…he [Locke] objects, that no Reason can be given for the Cohesion of the Parts of Extended Matter. If he means, that we can give no Physical Reason for it, (…) I grant it (…) But, if he thinks there cannot be a far Better and Clearer Reason given from the Supream Science, Metaphysicks, I deny it.’

Locke: ‘The sum of which argument is this we make the word body stand for an Idea of solid parts united togeather or cohering therefor we know what makes those parts cohere.’

Solid Philosophy, p. 248: ‘’Tis not in this Occasion only, but in many others too, that Great Scholars puzzle their Wits to find out Natural Causes for divers Effects, the true Reason for which is only owing to Trans-natural ones, or from these Altissime Causae, which only Metaphysicks give us…’

Locke: ‘Transnatural causes in natural philosophie are not natural causes and consequently supernatural i e immediate effects of divine power apearing out of the course of natural causes and effects a sort of philosophiseing which J.S. very much explodes’

Solid Philosophy, p. 249: ‘The same (…) is the Ground of Mr. Locke’s Perplexity how Extended Parts do cohere; to which, the properest and most Satisfactory Answer is, because there is Quantity in them, which is Essentially Continued; and, so does Formally give Coherence of Parts to Body, its Subject.’

Locke: ‘i e they do cohere because they doe cohere’

Solid Philosophy, p. 250 (mistakenly printed as p.251): ‘…and then to tell us, that The Idea of Spiritual Natures are as Clear as that of Bodily Substance, which he [Locke] takes such pains to shew is not Clear at all, is, as I conceive, no great Argument for their Clearness, nor their Existence neither; but rather, a strong Argument against both…’

Locke: ‘we may know that they exist though we can not explain all their properties and qualitys’

Solid Philosophy, pp. 253-254 [on Essay, II.xxv, ‘Of Relation’]: ‘…if the Relation be new, or such a one as before was not, there must be some Novelty in the Thing it self to ground it. Whence follows that, if there be such a Real Ground on the one side only, and no Real Ground on the other, there will be a Real Relation on the one side, and no Real Relation on the other, but only a Verbal one, or Extrinsical Denomination; Answering, or (as it were) Chiming Grammatically to the Term which is really Relative, v.g. Our Powers of Seeing of Understanding any thing, have a Real Relation to their proper Objects; both because such Objects Specifie the Power, or make it such a Power, that is, give it its peculiar or distinct Essence; as also, because the Power is by the Object actuated and determin’d to act; that is, the Power is intrinsecally Chang’d, or otherwise than it was, by means of the Object suffers no kind of Change, nor is it at all Alter’d, or otherwise than it was by being known or seen.

Locke: ‘what chang? does the father in the I<n>dies suffer when his son is born in England?’

Solid Philosophy, p. 255 [on Essay, II.xxvi, ‘Of Cause and Effect, and other Relations’]: ‘What I conceive of Causality is, that ’tis the Power of Participating or Communicating some Thing, or some mode of Thing, to the Patient, which was before some way or other, in the Thing that caus’d it…’

Locke: ‘So fire that softens wax and hardens clay had some way or other softness and hardness in it’

Solid Philosophy, p. 255: ‘And hence it is that God, our Creatour, has no Real Relation to his Creatures, tho’ they have many to him; because he is no otherwise, nor better, in the least, by Creating them, than he had been in Case he had not Created any thing at all; and therefore there is no Ground in Him of a Real Correlation to them.’

Locke: ‘Does noething found a real relation but what makes the subject better what thinks he Robber and Robbed. Tormentor and Tormented?’

Solid Philosophy, p. 258 [on Essay, II.xxvii, ‘Of Identity and Diversity’]: ‘Why Mr. Locke, who allows the Complexion of Accidents to constitute the Specifick Nature, should not follow the same Principle, in making a greater Complexion of the Modes Intrinsecally distinguish the Individuum from all others, and so constitute It, I cannot imagin; it being so perfectly Consonant, and necessarily Consequent to his own Doctrine, and agreeable to Evident Principles.’

Locke: ‘What complexion of accidents besides those of place and perhaps time can distinguish two attoms perfectly solid and round and of the same diameter?’

Solid Philosophy, p. 258: ‘And, were it otherwise, so that the Soul were apt to work more perfectly than the Body were able to go along with it; first, that greater Degree of Rationality in the Soul would be lost, and in vain; and next, the Man, God’s Workmanship, would be disproportion’d, and, in a manner, Monstrous in his most Essential Parts. ‘

Locke: ‘How will this doctrine hold in a very witty or rational man who by a knock looses his parts in the strength of his age?’

Solid Philosophy, p. 264: ‘We are indeed to take the Meanings of Words which express our Natural Notions, or Simple Apprehensions, from the Users of them, the Populace; but, the Applying, or Joining those Words or Notions to one another, in order to the framing Thoughts or Judgments of such Connexions, we are to take only from the Learned, or from the Principles belonging to the Sciences that treat of such Subjects, and not at all from the Vulgar…’

Locke: ‘This, if it has any meaning, is that we should take the signification of our words words from one sort of man and joyn them by the direction of others. whereas their signification is the only rule and measure of joyneing them’

Solid Philosophy, p. 265: ‘Wherefore the Man, or that Thing which is to be the Knower, must have had Individuality or Personality from other Principles, antecedently to this Knowledge call’d Consciousness; and consequently, he will retain his Identity, or continue the same Man, or (which is equivalent) the same Person, as long as he has those Individuating Principles.’

Locke: ‘A man has the individuality of a man before he has knowledg but is not a person before he has knowledg’

Solid Philosophy, p. 267: ‘Nor is there any farther Mystery in the Word [Self;] for it means no more but our own same Intelligent Individuum, with which we are well acquainted, partly by Direct, partly by Reflex Knowledges.’

Locke: ‘An intelligent individuum is not an intelligent individuum before it has knowledg.’

Solid Philosophy, p. 295 [On Essay, III, ‘Of Words’]: ‘But, till the Best, and only Proper Way (which I mention’d lately) to make Definitions be allow’d and taken, I am sure there will be no new ones made that will deserve that Name…’

Locke: ‘He mentions his as the only proper way to make definitions, let him by examples show that it will doe.’

Solid Philosophy, p. 297: ‘I should be glad to see how one of our new Philosophers would define Motion…’

Locke: ‘This is idlely proposed to Mr Locke who denies that motion can be defind’

Solid Philosophy, p. 305: [When we come to know more about an object, we add more distinct ideas to the confused idea that we already have. It is neither a specifical notion, nor a new Nominal Essence] ‘(for, let us discover so many New Qualities in Gold, every Man will call that Thing Gold still)’

Locke: ‘yes because he in that thing finds his nominal essence of gold’

Solid Philosophy, pp. 317-318 [On Essay, IV.i, ‘Of Knowledge in General’]: ‘Knowledge cannot exist in the Connexion or Disagreement of Ideas. (…) this Connexion of Ideas (…) is that which is signify’d by the Word [Est;] which being so, in this Proposition, [Sugar is sweet,] the Word [Est] must according to him, if only Ideas must be connected, naturally and genuinly affirm, that one of those Ideas is the other Idea, or that the Idea of Sugar is the Idea of Sweet…’

Locke: ‘If the proposition were sugar is sweetnesse it would be false’

Solid Philosophy, p. 319: ‘First, it has been prov’d by many Arguments, that all our Notions are Partial Conceptions of the Thing …’

Locke: ‘Is the notion of a Triangle or of the number 3 a partial conception of the thing?’

Solid Philosophy, p. 320: ‘…we cannot predicate a Concrete of an Abstract, nor an Abstract of a Concrete

Locke: ‘v.g. Haec longitudo illi est aequalis. Ebrietas dedecoret. Is not in these the concrete predicated of the abstract?’

Solid Philosophy, p. 324: ‘Tis not in this occasion only, but in divers others, tho’ I have not always noted them, that Mr.Locke and my self have, without design’d Confederacy, agreed in Positions of great Moment; which, I know not how, have escap’d the Thoughts of all other Authors I have seen.’

Locke: ‘Yes it is easily observable in his book which was published 6 or 7 years after Mr Lockes that it has many things in it very conformable to what Mr Locke had published soe long before.’

Solid Philosophy, p. 327: ‘Whence I cannot see, why he limits Sensitive Knowledge to the Notion of Existence onely; or, that our Senses do make us know onely that a Thing is: For, certainly, our Senses do as well tell us the Wall is white, as that the Wall is…’

Locke: ‘Then I think our senses as much tell us that whiteness exists as that the wall exists’

Solid Philosophy, p. 330: ‘Now, more and less of Divisibility Consider’d, in order to Natural Agents, is the same as to be See Method to Science, B. I. L. 3, §§ 1,2more easily, and less easily Divisible by by those Agents, which we call to be Rare, and Dense.’

Locke: ‘which is rarer quicksilver or . steel? and which is the more easily divisible of the two?’

Solid Philosophy, pp. 332-333: ‘That great Pellucidity in the Air is necessarily, and properly refunded into its extream Divisibility, or Rarity; by which it becomes easily penetrable in all its Parts, by those Spicula Ignea, the Rays of the Sun; and Opacity, for the same Reason, is the Proper Effect of Density; which hinders its Subject from being penetrated, or Divided by them; whence also it is a Proper Cause of Repelling, or Reflecting them.’

Locke: ‘v: g which is more dense a diamond or corck? . christal or the pouder of Christal? in these and 1000 other instances the more dense is the more pellucid.’

Solid Philosophy, p. 333: ‘…Who sees not that Liquidity, which makes its Subject easily yielding to be flatted evenly, as we see in Ponds; or driven to run in Cavities, by the common Motion of Gravitation, is a proper Effect of Rarity, as Consistency is of Density? Spissitude is a Constipation of Dense Parts, or the Want of Pores to admit the Ingress of other Bodies.’

Locke: ‘what think you of quick silver and a spung?’

Solid Philosophy, p. 337: ‘The Intermediate Colours are made by the Mixture and Demixture of those Extreams; whence, out of the Degrees of their partaking those, Contrary or Subcontrary Qualities are framed, as Blue, Green, Yellow, and all other Colours.’

Locke: ‘which mixtures and demixtures of white and blew black will never produce a blew a red or an yellow’

Solid Philosophy, pp. 342-343: ‘I pass by the Oddness of the Position, that the Idea, which is a Picture, should be a Picture of it self, or represent it self: I only note, that this Allegation which should clear the Point, quite loses it, and gives it up.’

Locke: ‘may not colours put togeather in figures as phansys the painter make a picture which shall have noe reference to any real being?’

Solid Philosophy, p. 343 [On Essay, IV.iv, ‘Of the Reality of our Knowledge’]: ‘Is not this to make Philosophy not the Knowledge of Things, but of Ideas only; and to pretend, that the Thing must only be held True, if it be Conformable to our Ideas?’

Locke: ‘Things are truly what they are whether we have any Idea of them or noe. But they cannot belong to any ones specific name, unlesse they agree to his specific Idea’

Solid Philosophy, p. 343: ‘…he expresly says, these Complex Ideas are made by the Mind, and not taken from the Thing, not like it…’

Locke: ‘where does he say soe?’

Solid Philosophy, p. 345: ‘For, if he had once his Notions from the Thing, they would be still the Thing in the Mind, and Real, tho’ the Individual Objects, whence they were taken, be perish’d. Nay, more; those Things would have a Better, a more Durable, and more Noble existence in the Mind, than they have in Nature.’

Locke: ‘Then God or angels have a better more dureable and nobler existence in the minde of man than they have in their own actual beings’

Solid Philosophy, p. 346: ‘Thus, when the Hand strikes or wounds a Man, ’tis truly said, that the Man (which signifies the whole Thing) did it, and is answerable for it; and, if he kills the Person he struck, the whole Man will be hang’d for it, tho’ the hand onely, and not the Legs, Head, Neck, &c. gave the Blow.’

Locke: ‘If a man falling from a house strike out another mans eye or brains with his foot is that foot the whole man and shall the whole man be punished for it?’

Solid Philosophy, p. 351: ‘…wherefore they must either prove, by other Grounds, that Similitudes can give us Knowledge of the Things, or they do petere Principium, beg the Question, and prove idem per idem.’

Locke: ‘He argues against Ideas because they are similitudes and yet blames Mr Locke, in many places, for saying they are not similitudes. particularly p. 347’

Solid Philosophy, p. 352: ‘What concerns us is to look at our Principles, and not bot be misled from them, by reflecting on such odd prenatural Productions; as I must think Mr. Locke is, when he thinks Changelings to be something between a Man and a Beast.’

Locke: ‘The author has found a short way to solid philosophie by haveing noe thing to doe that does not agree with our systemes’

Solid Philosophy, pp. 352-353: ‘The Division of Animal into Rational and Irrational is made by such Differences as are perfectly Contradictory to one another; between which there can no more be any Third or Middle, than there can be a Medium between is and is not.’

Locke: ‘Betwixt Rational and irrational there is noe medium but every one admits not the definition of man to be animal rationale’

Solid Philosophy, pp. 356-357: ‘But I must severely reflect on his describing Moral Truths, § 11. to be the Speaking Things according to the Perswasion of our own Mindes, tho’ the Proposition we speak does not agree to the Reality of Things: For, since it is most Evidently known, that the Persuasions of Men’s Mindes not only may, but do frequently contradict one another; by this Definition of Moral Truth both Sides of the Contradiction may be True; which destroys Truth by confounding it with Falshood…’

Locke: ‘Not soe; Because the contradiction here is speaking and not speaking according to the speakers pretension. and soe both sides of the contradiction never be morally true’

Solid Philosophy, p. 360 [On Essay, IV.vi, ‘Of Universal Propositions, their Truth and Certainty’]: ‘We cannot indeed know this [that all men are rational] by the poll: But, if by the word [Man] we mean no more but a Rational Animal, it is so far from Impossible to know, and affirm that All Men are Rational, that ’tis Impossible not to know it.’

Locke: ‘without doubt he that knows what he makes the word man stand for knows what he makes it stand for’

Solid Philosophy, p. 363 [On Essay, IV.vii, ‘Of Maxims’]: ‘Knowledge may be either consider’d, as instill’d by insensible Degrees, into Infants, or the Ruder Sort; or, as Reducible to the clearest Grounds, by Men of Art. Now, I cannot think that Mr. Locke imagins, that we, or any Man, hold that Maxims were meant for Infants, of the Vulgar…’

Locke: ‘knowledg then it seems was not meant for infantes or the vulgar’

Solid Philosophy, p. 365: ‘But, should any Sceptick ask why the Idea of Yellow is the Idea of Yellow? (…) it would not look so extravagant to answer, because Every thing is what it is: And, I believe, Nature would force Mr. Locke, or any other to give this for his Reason. In like manner, should he ask why a Man is a Man? It would look preter-natural to answer, because a Tree is a Tree, Whereas, it would look very natural to answer, because Every Thing is it Self, or, is what it is.’

Locke: ‘There is noe reason to be given of any of these propositions for they are all self evident, and soe uncapeable to make any be made clearer or certainer’

Solid Philosophy, p. 366: ‘…Let Mr. Locke tell a Sceptick, that Yellow is Yellow, and not blue; he may answer, that he will yield to neither Proposition; because, Yellow and Blue are Species of Colour, and (according to Mr. Locke’s Grounds) he knows not the distinct Bounds, or precise Extent of neither of them; and therefore, should he grant it, he must assent to he knows not what.’

Locke: ‘Where is it Mr Locke says soe of simple Ideas’

Solid Philosophy, p. 367: [Sergeant argues that general notions are clearer than particular notions. Hence a sceptic, who doubts that yellow is yellow, can be cured by the use of the more general proposition the same is the same with it self.]

Locke: ‘According to this argument (if it were true that general Ideas were the clearest) the general maximes would be of noe use to prove that yellow is yellow, for all his doubts about what is yellow would (if that were anything material) be still the same.’

Solid Philosophy, pp. 368-369: [Sergeant refers to Locke’s comment that maxims can be useful to ‘stop the Mouths of Wranglers’] ‘…For, Whence could they have this strange Virtue to stop the Mouths of such Unreasonable Men, but because their Evidence is Greater than any others, or than Particular Self-evident Propositions are?’

Locke: ‘Not because their evidence is greater than any more particular self evident proposition but because serveing in all cases they are more inculcated and used than the other’

Solid Philosophy, p. 368: ‘He [Locke] seems to mislike the Procedure by Praecognita and Praeconcessa; whereas, his Acute Wit will find, upon Reflexion, that it is impossible we can make an Ordinary, much less any Speculative, Discourse, but the Discoursers must agree in something that is either Foreknown, or (at least) Foregranted, for, if the two Disputants disagree in all their Principles and Grounds, and one of them still denies ALL the other affirms, ’tis impossible they should Discourse together at all.’

Locke [referring to the word ‘Discoursers’]: ‘He means Disputants. but Mr L speaks not of Disputation but Knowledg’

Solid Philosophy, p. 369: [Sergeant insists on the Absolute Necessity of the two Maxims: 1. Everything must necessarily be what it is 2. A thing cannot be and not be at the same time.] ‘To apprehend more clearly the Usefulness of these two Principles, let us suppose a Man quite Devested of them, and to have neither of them in his Judgment, and then reflect what he is good for.’

Locke: ‘A man divested i e quite bereft or incapable of knowing them to be true is incapable of all knowledg for he is incapable of knowing the same to be the same and different Ideas to be different. But the same would happen to one that knows not that a Mangastan is a Mangastan and not a Turnep.’

Solid Philosophy, p. 370: ‘Every particular Body in the World must be in some place.’

Locke: ‘According to this Maxim of our Author in What place is the Soule or an Angel by his doctrin’

Solid Philosophy, p. 372: ‘Whereas only the Definition, by explicating the true Essence of a Thing, shews us Distinctly the true Spiritual Notion of it.’

Locke: ‘Where are these definitions that explicate the true Essences of things? and (excepting mathematical) how many of them has J.S.? He would obleig the world by a list of them if it were of noe more but those things he has talked of in his books and pretends to know’

Solid Philosophy, p. 374: ‘…yet, if I, mistaking, or not mistaking, have such a Meaning of it [of a word] in my Mind, (…) that Meaning is truly in me: Nor, tho’ I be rectify’d as to the Common Use of that Word, and put another Name to it; yet my Meaning, whether properly or improperly signify’d, is still indivisibly and unalterably the same.’

Locke: ‘He that has a meaning to any word has it no doubt whilst he has it: But he that varys the meaning of his terms or knows not precisely what he means by them (as noe thing is more ordinary) fils his discourse with obscure and confused Ideas’

Solid Philosophy, p. 374: ‘If, then, he only means, that the Mis-application or Abuse of them does great Harm, he magnifies General Maxims, while he intended to disparage them; For, it is generally noted, that those are the Best Things, that, Mis-us’d, do the Greatest Harm. By this Argument, we must lay aside all Religion, as well as General Maxims; since, not all the Things in the World, put together, have done so great Mischief, as Mis-us’d Religion…’

Locke: ‘Who says they should be laid aside?’

Solid Philosophy, pp. 375-376 [On Essay, IV.viii, ‘Of Trifling Propositions’]: ‘…Matter alone, since it is a meer Power to be another Thing, being, of its own Notion, utterly Indeterminate, (which is the true Sense of Aristotle’s Description of it,) is not capable of Existing, or a Thing…’

Locke: ‘Matter is a solid substance and not a power. Here J.S. falls under the same rebuke which he bestows on Mr Locke for a misunderstood expression and not for any mistake in his meaning for that by body he means an extended solid substance and not the modes of Extension and Solidity without substance may be seen B.II.C XIII § 12. B III C. X §. 15Though argueing against Cartes’s use of the word Body

376

he thought it sufficient to mention those modes which in the proper use of the word Body are different from that sole Mode which Des Cartes uses it for, without mentioning of Substance. And therefor to use his own expression Meer power is noe more the Notion of matter than an Hors-shoe is a pancake’

Solid Philosophy, p. 376: ‘How Mr.Locke comes not to treat of Matter in his whole Book, I know not…’

Locke: ‘I desire him to look into B. III C: X. § 15’

Solid Philosophy, p. 377-378: ‘But, I absolutely deny that any Man can possibly have the true and distinct Notion of Man, unless he conceives him to be Rational. As for what he tells us, he has discours’d with very Rational Men, who have actually deny’d they are Men…’

Locke: ‘v. p. 8’

Solid Philosophy, p. 380: ‘But, I shall be briefer here upon this Subject, having demonstrated in my Method, Book 2. Less. 2, and 3. by many Arguments, which, I am very confident, are Unanswerable, that all First Principles must be Identical Propositions: Whence, either those Arguments must be shewn Invalid, or it must be forcibly deny’d by him that there are any First Principles at all…’

Locke: ‘Corpus est quantum. Aequalia alicui tertio sunt aequalia inter se instanced by JS in the place quoted are not Identical propositions’

Solid Philosophy, pp. 380-381: ‘We may speak of (…) all other Considerations or Notions of the Thing (…) and ’tis a hard Case if we may not be allow’d to say something of the Metaphysical Verity of the Thing (…) And, if we may say any thing of it, I defie all Mankind to shew me, that that Saying can be any other but an Identical Proposition.’

Locke: ‘An Identical proposition is the affirming the very same term of it self.’

Solid Philosophy, p. 382: [Identical propositions are the first and most evident truths. That is why educated as well as uneducated men…] ‘…make them the Ultimate Ressort of all their Persuasions, and endeavour to Reduce and Resolve all their other Knowledges into them.’

Locke: ‘Knowledg has its bottom only in the perception of the agreement or diversity of any two Ideas and is neither founded on nor can be reduced to Identical propositions’

Solid Philosophy, pp. 388-389: [On Essay, IV.ix, ‘Of our Knowledge of Existence’]: ‘This Excellent Author discourses very Solidly, when he says, that Universal Propositions, of which we can have certain Knowledge, do not concern Existence. (…) But, when he says that such Propositions do not concern Existence, he means (I suppose) Existence in Nature, or our of the Mind; (or else not at all;)…’

Locke: ‘An ingeneous man that had read Ch: IX could have made noe such question what Mr Locke there meant.’

Solid Philosophy, pp. 390-391: [On Essay, IV.x, ‘Of our Knowledge of the Existence of a God’]: ‘He will say that, tho’ it [incogitative matter] could not do this [produce Thought] of it self, yet God could make it do so. But if God cannot contradict himself (…), then, since [he] (…) has Establisht each kind of Nature to be it self and no other; then, to put in God a Power to confound those Natures again, (…) is to put a Power in God to do Contradictions, that is, to do Impossibilities…’

Locke: ‘This is to suppose that god hath not given cogitation to any parts of matter and thence to conclude he cannot. But the proof must begin at the other end’

Solid Philosophy, p. 392: [Sergeant claims that Locke’s ‘Philosophizing by Ideas’ hinders him to make a clear divison between Corporeal and Spiritual Natures.]

Locke: ‘Mr Locke’s way puts an externall difference between material and immaterial. But that all thinking things are immaterial is supposed only and must be provd, and till that be donne what Mr Locke has said may be true how much so ever it may dis…. any received hypothesis’

Solid Philosophy, p. 395: [According to Locke, we cannot rule out the possibility that animals are endowed with reason. Sergeant concludes that this leads to dire consequences.] ‘One, That the Nature of Man and Brute are confounded; since all those Chief Operations Proper to Man, are Communicable to Brutes.’

Locke: ‘If he will read again and consider what Mr Locke has said in the case he will find them not confounded.’

Solid Philosophy, p. 395: ‘…his [Locke’s] way of Ideas will be conceiv’d to be meerly Phantastick and Unphilosophical; being most unlike the Ideas in the Divine Understanding, the Original Ground of all Truth…’

Locke: ‘J.S: speak here as if he knew the Ideas in the divine understanding. I wish he would tell us how he comes to know them, for I fear in this matter he makes god like unto himself and measures the Divine understanding by his own’

Solid Philosophy, p. 399 [On Essay, IV.iv]: ‘The 11th Chapter [of Locke’s Essay] treats Of our knowledge of the Existence of other Things; by which words he means, other Things than our selves. He seems to ground his Discourse on this Position, that no particular Man can know the Existence of any other Being, but only when, by Actually operating on him, it makes it self perceive’d by him…’

Locke: ‘Mr Locke haveing before spoke of our knowledg of the Existence of our selves and of god J.S interprets other things here very strangly

Solid Philosophy, pp. 399-400: ‘But, why we may not gather by our Reason, the Existence of Spiritual Beings, or Angels (…) from some Operation on other Things in Nature that can onely proceed from them, I cannot discern…’

Locke: ‘Gathering by Reason unlesse it amount to demonstration produces not knowledg but beleif.’

Solid Philosophy, p. 401: ‘…when we are ripe for more express Knowledges, those Impressions made by one of our own Parts upon others, do not cause in use the Notion of Existence, (…) because we know already, and before-hand, that we do exist; But, put case we did not, would not these Impressions make us know by Sensation our own Existence, as well as that of any other Body whatever?’

Locke: ‘A man may see his hand and there by know that a hand exists but tis not there by that he knows his own existence’

Solid Philosophy, pp. 405-406 [On Essay, IV.xii, ‘Of the Improvement of our Knowledge’]: [Sergeant on] ‘Mr Locke’s main Principle (…) All Knowledge of the Certainty of Principles, and consequently, the Way to improve our Knowledge, is, to get, and fix in our Minds, Clear, Distinct and Compleat Ideas, as far as they are to be had, and annex to them Proper and Constant Names. (…) to embrace this Principle, we must be oblig’d to quit all our Self-evident Maxims, as of little Use, upon which our selves, and all the Learned part of the World, have proceeded hitherto.’

Locke: ‘who is it obleiges him to quit them?’

Solid Philosophy, p. 407: ‘But, where shall we find any Sect of Philosophers, who, for want of Exact Skill in Logick and Metaphysics, are not forc’d to build upon Hypotheses, (and those generally False ones too;) but our Anti-Ideists, whom I take to be true Followers of Aristotle, in his main Principles, and the only true Understanders of his Doctrine.’

Locke: ‘Here the good gent: himself falls into the same fault which he condems in me p. 404 for adviseing to beware what principles one takes’

Solid Philosophy, p. 410 [On Essay, IV.xiv, ‘Of Judgment’]: ‘The former [Outward Action] does (generally) concern the External Conveniences or Necessities of our Temporal Life here; the Later [Inward Assent], the Interiour and Natural Perfection of our Soul; which is the Adhering to Truth, and rejecting of Errour.’

Locke: ‘I thought that outward actions had concerned our future eternal state too’

Solid Philosophy, p. 413: ‘But, how does this agree with his Contradistinguishing formerly [Judgement,] according to its whole Latitude, or in its General Notion, from Knowledge; unless we should say, that we only do right when we judge at Hap-hazard, or judge Right by Chance.’

Locke: ‘Very well for knowledg is seeing the thing to be soe. Judgment when right is assent to a true proposition without certainly knowing it to be true’

Solid Philosophy, p. 414: ‘Cannot we suspend our Judgement till Evidence appears?’

Locke: ‘Judgment Mr S: says may be suspended. then it is not knowledg for that cannot be suspended’

Solid Philosophy, p. 414: ‘May we not judge a Conclusion that is Demonstrated to be True, because it is Demonstrated?’

Locke: ‘Noe, we see it to be true if we see the demonstration and doe not judg’

Solid Philosophy, p. 418 [On Essay, IV.xvi, ‘Of the Degrees of Assent’]: ‘To Assent to any Truth, … is to say interiourly, the Thing [is;] and to Dissent, is to say the Thing [is; not.]

Locke: ‘To assent I take it is to say I beleive a thing to be true

Solid Philosophy, p. 431 [On Essay, IV.xvii, ‘Of Reason’]: [On the use of syllogisms.] ‘Certainly, the seeing the middle Term placed in the middle, as it ought, will make a Reflecting Man see better the Connexion of the Terms; whence, besides its own aptness to connect, it comes, even by vertue of its place, to be seen to be Immediate to each of the Extremes…’

Locke: ‘as in the syllogisms of the Schools it is not’

Solid Philosophy, pp. 434-434: [Sergeant agrees with Locke that syllogisms are of no use in ‘Probable Discourses’.] ‘For Syllogism shows an Infallibly-Certain way of Concluding; whence nothing can bear that Test but what does conclude; Whereas Probabilities being grounded on Common Mediums, do not conclude at all; and therefore it would do Probability a Great Disservice to bring it to the Touchstone of all True or Conclusive Reasoning, a Syllogistick Form.’

Locke: ‘what becomes then of all his Master Aristotles pains about topical arguments’

Solid Philosophy, p. 435: ‘But why he [Locke] should think it [syllogistic reasoning] does not serve to increase Knowledge, is a strange Riddel; the whole Design of Artificial, or Syllogistick, Reasoning being to Deduce Conclusions not yet known, from Premises which, are either perfectly Foreknown, or at least better known.’

Locke: ‘Syllogisme is to shew the rectitude of what we have inferd if there be a doubt of it but does not help us to finde the Medius terminus by virtue of which we doe infer.’

Solid Philosophy, p. 437: ‘…this Acute Author [Locke] fancies Unintelligible Mysteries in the Annexing Words to his Ideas. (…) [I] cannot discern any Annexion other than this, that Men have agreed that such Words, shall signify such and such Things or Notions; all other Annexion being Unaccountable.’

Locke: ‘They have either not agreed or doe not keep to that agreement?

Solid Philosophy, p. 439 [On Essay, IV.xviii, ‘Of Faith and Reason, and their distinct Provinces’]: ‘I grant too, that Revelation cannot be admitted against clear Evidence of Reason. I wish, that instead of the word [Revelation] he had rather said [Pretence of Revelation] for, otherwise, some Readers may hap to take his words in a Dis-edifying sense; as if it were a possible Case, that Revelation it self may be supposed to be opposit to Clear Evidence of Reason…’

Locke: ‘I perceive that J.S argues from the summarys by the sides. but Mr Locke’s words in the text § 5 are that noe proposition can be received for divine revelation if it be contrary to our clear intuitive knowledg

Solid Philosophy, p. 448 [On Essay, IV.xx, ‘Of wrong Assent, or Errour’]: ‘...that all Errour or Wrong Assent, does onely Spring from Assenting at all upon Probable Motives. For did they [Men] Assent onely upon Evidence, it is Impossible they should ever erre; since Evidence for an Errour is in it self impossible.’

Locke: ‘soe that a man is to be a sceptic in all where he has not demonstration’

Solid Philosophy, p. 449: [Why people may take wrong measures of probabilities.] ‘All these are so many Remora’s to the Advancement of Science, and Motes in our Intellectual Eye, hindring it from seeing Evident Truth. Yet, none of them, but has some kind of Probability, (as the World goes;) or, at least, will furnish Men with probable Arguments: For, a very slight Thing serves to make a Thing Probable.’

Locke: ‘A very slight thing will not serve to make a thing probable because the account must be cast up on both sides to shew the ballance’

Solid Philosophy, p. 450: ‘…Man’s true Nature, which is Rational, is to be rated according to the Conformity we ought to conceive it had from the Idea of it in the Divine Understanding, its true Essence; where none can doubt but it was Perfect, till it came to be slubber’d and sully’d by the tampering of Second Causes, and their Never-uniform Circumstances.’

Locke: ‘There are then it seems Ideas in gods understanding.’

Solid Philosophy, p. 457: ‘The Lowest of our Notions in that Line, which are in any degree Common or General, is that of Homo; which treats of Human Nature, of its Operations proper to Man, as Man…’

Locke: ‘And why not Elephas as well as homo’

Solid Philosophy, pp. 456-457 [On Essay, IV.xxi, ‘Of the Division of the Sciences’]: [Sergeant defends] ‘the Connatural way how Sciences are to be Divided (…) The immediate Notion under Ens is Corpus; and this is the Object of Natural Philosophy. (…) The Lowest of our Notions in that Line, which are in any degree Common or General, is that of Homo; which treats of Humane Nature, of its Operations proper to Man, as Man; and Chiefly of his Primary Operation Reasoning; and then, the Science which shows how to order those Operations right that belong to his Understanding…’

Locke: ‘. How does the understanding which is denyd to belong to body come under the Notion of body’


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Essay, ‘Epistle to the Reader’, p. 13.
In the Ideae cartesianae ad Lydium veritatis lapidem…expensae (London: A. Roper, 1698), p. 33, Sergeant indeed admits: ‘Hâc de occasione licèt parergon sit, candor me admonet ut declarem quòd quodam in loco, tum D. Lockium malè intellexerim, tam acerbiore quàm par erat Notâ Censuram meam protulerim.’
Essay, II.xxiii.4, p. 297 (section header): ‘No clear Idea of Substance in general.’
Reference to Locke’s marginal note on p. 378, see below.
See above, Locke’s marginalium on Solid Philosophy, pp. [xxxviii-xxxix] and the editorial note.
In the next section, Solid Philosophy, p. 63, Sergeant writes indeed: ‘Yet I do not judge this Opportunity so pressing or proper, as to oblige me to treat such a large Point fully, or to set my self to demonstrate and smooth every step I take in this untrodden and rugged way.’
Reference to § 6 not clear.
Essay, II.i.12, p. 110.
See Essay, II.viii.15-22, pp. 137-140.
Essay, II.xviii.16, p. 219.
See Essay, II.xx.1, p. 229: ‘Amongst the simple Ideas, which we receive both from Sensation and Reflection, Pain and Pleasure are two considerable ones. For as in the Body, there is Sensation barely in its self, or accompanied with Pain or Pleasure: so the Thought, or Perception, of the Mind is simply so, or else accompanied also with Pleasure or Pain, Delight or Trouble, call it how you please.’
On uneasiness see Essay, II.xxi.31, p. 250 ff.
See Essay, II.xxiii.23, p. 308.
Essay, III.iv.8-9, pp. 422-423.
‘E. g. This length is equal to that length.’
‘Drunkenness is unseeming.’
See Essay, IV.ii.14, pp. 536-538.
Sergeant’s note; see idem, p. 25: ‘Intrinsical Differences can be no other but more and less of the Common Notion…’
‘Spissitude’ = density, thickness, compactness (OED).
Locke probably refers to Sergeant, Solid Philosophy, p. 347: ‘…this Tenet, which puts their Complex Ideas not onely not to be the thing, (…) but, not to be so much as a Copy or Resemblance of it…’
See Essay, IV.iv.14-16, pp. 569-573.
See Essay, IV.v.11, p. 578.
Essay, IV.vii.11, p. 601.
Essay, II. xiii.11, p. 171 (= sect. 12 of the third edition to which Locke refers): ‘…Body something that is solid, and extended…’
Essay, III.x.15, p. 498: ‘…Body stands for a solid extended figured Substance…’
Essay, III.x.15, p. 498, marginal header: ‘Instance in Matter
Reference to Locke’s marginal note on p. 8, see above.
Reference to Sergeant, Method to Science, II.iii, pp. 151-152: ‘…Physicks. The First Principle that grounds that whole Science, according to some Modern Philosophers, is, [Corpus est Quantum], in which tho’ the Subject and Predicate do indeed differ Grammatically, the one of them being Substantively the other Adjectively express’d, yet if we rifle the Words to get out the Inward Sense, (as Philosophers ought) we shall find that, since all the Essential Differences they allow between a Body and a Spirit, is this only, that That is Divisible, This Indivisible, as also, that Quantity and Divisibility into Integral parts are (with them) the same Notion…’
Reference to Sergeant, Method to Science, II.iii, p. 154: ‘…the First Principles in Mathematicks are Identical. For example; At our first entrance into Euclid, we are met with those Famous and Useful Principles: Those things that are Equal to the same, are Equal to one another…’
See Essay, IV.ix.1, p. 618: ‘…that universal Propositions, of whose Truth or Falshood we can have certain Knowledge, concern not Existence...’
See e.g. Essay, II.xi.10, p. 159: ‘If it may be doubted, Whether Beasts compound and enlarge their Ideas that way, to any degree: This, I think, I may be positive in, That the power of Abstracting is not at all in them; and that the having of general Ideas, is that which puts a perfect distinction betwixt Man and Brutes…’
Essay, IV.xi.1, p. 630.
See Essay, IV.xi.12, p. 637.
Essay, IV.xii.6, p. 642.
See Sergeant, Solid Philosophy, p. 404: ‘…he that wrastles with another, must either fix his Foot on some Firm Ground, or he will fall himself, instead of overthrowing his Adversary’.
Essay, IV.xviii.5, p. 692.
Underlined by Locke.
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