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34. Observations on Bold’s papers (1698)

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§ i.

3 it is one of the

<§ i>

5 This treatise

<§ i>

6 approbation by those who understood English

<§ i>

14 treated him with

<§> ii

ult creator. To which let me adde

<§> iv

45 have by an immediate comparison of them a visible

<§> v

35 , by laying before their view in the natural order of their connection all the several Ideas, whose agreement or disagreement he perceiveing has knowledge, and which laying togeather according to their agreement or disagreement makes a good deduction whereby others if they will attend to it may attein knowledg too. For to the makeing a deduction rationaly he that makes it must be supposed certain or knowing or perceiveing of the connection of the several Ideas conteined in his deduction which when he has ranged before anothers view in their due order soe that the agreement or disagreement in each step of the progresse may be plainly perceived he is said to infer right. If

<§ v>

47 and carefully compare all the Ideas conteined in them. He

<§ v>

52 by the intervention of some Ideas conteined in the proposition from which

<§> vi

14 of any proposition

<§> x

5 and separable parts

<§ x>

p 6. 2 Q: who is it that has demonstrated that the soule is not a material sensible substance?

<§>xiii

18 there seems to be some mistake in the writeing.

§ xv

7 thing we know

<§> xvi

14 undetermined, that it

<§> xvii

13 Notwithstanding. 5 is

<§ xvii>

25 And perhaps etcetera. I doe not see to what purpose all this to the word names is brought in

<§> xviii

Q whether the first may not also be reteined. It seems to me a right answer. In the second paper you rightly take notice of the obscuritie or unintelliblenesse of his question as he puts it but then in answer to it I thinke you must take care to shew that one modification of matter is not the product of another modification of matter, nor one power the product of another power you must keepe these distinct and not say that | powers are not the products of modification for some times they are. but yet it is unintelligible to say that faculties i e powers are produced out of powers.

§ xix xx

I doe not see also any fault in the argument of thes e paragraph<s> in the first paper. though in the 2d paper the weaknesse of what MrI—s says be more fully laid open

paper 2d

No 1

It should have any powers at all i e be capable of any action

No2

superadded to the substance of matter in any caseand soe in other placeswhere you finde the same expression for powers are not superadded to our Ideas of matter but to the substance of matter as you know for substances alone are agents and have powers

No 3

Then god cannot by the modification of its primary qualities give powers to matter

<§> xxi

8 when under a certain modification a power of thinkeing

<§ xxi>

10 though we doe not know what this modification is nor how this power is superadded to it, It is not said that the power of thinkeing is the natural or necessary consequence of any modification of matter that we can conceive that which Mr L<ocke> says is that he sees noe contradiction in it that god should if he pleased give to certain Systems of matter put to geather i e modified as he thinks fit a power of thinkeing. The power of thinkeing is not proper or peculiar to a material substance. Nor can we prove demonstratively because we know not upon what modification of substance it depends or is annexd to But for any thing —

§ xxi

18 v. Bp W<orcester’>s 1 Answ p. 78—and to the other since if as is allowed in this very dispute the same substance may be soe modified as to be sometimes material and sometimes immaterial it is not impossible to thinke it may have the power of thinkeing when it is material as when it is immaterial For as the power of thinkeing doth not make Immaterial substance

§ xxii

15 And it is noe better to say that omnipotency may superadde to an immaterial substance it m…me..ing immaterial divisibility or any other property of matter but what a faculty of extension is I doe not understand. A property of thinkeing superadded

No 5

being a qualification of substance where by it is enabled to thinke And all

No 6

this power of thinkeing

No 7

qualification superadded

No 8

As the power of produceing the Idea of blew or sweet or any other distinct power being superadded to any solid substance

No 9

from its haveing such a power

No 10

when the substance is considerd

No 11

In this and the following lines put power for modification

No 12

If it be said immaterial and the | power of thinkeing are the same or however that the | bare power of Thinkeing is to immaterial substance the same that actual solidity is to material this allows that an immaterial substance may exist without the action of thinkeing and only says that it is capable of thinkeing when ever god will actually give it thought or put it into that action, and such a power as this substance that has the modification of solidity is confessed to have since tis confessed god may take away solidity from it if he pleases and than afterwards if he pleases give it actual thought Soe that substance whether material or immaterial has in it such a capacity or power of thinkeing that it can have actuall thought when god pleases. Perhaps it will be said that the same substance indeed has | a power or is capable of thought or of Solidity when ever god pleases to bestow either of them on it but god cannot give both Solidity and thought to any substance togeather which is the very question in debate and remains to be proved If it be said that actual thinkeing is to immaterial substance as actual solidity is to material substance inseparable from it these two things are to be proved 1 that god has created any substance that is always in action or always thinks for thinkeing is an action 2 that if it be soe how it willl follow from thence that because god has made some substances not solid which think always therefor he cannot give to substances which have the modification of solidity a power to thinke sometimes Solidity and thinkeing are evidently distinct Ideas

No 13

our general Idea of substance can be noe otherwise specified but by these two properties of Solidity and thinkeing

No 14

But by virtue of such a power superadded to the substance under a certain modification though it be solid, that it can think If the power

No 15

Whether substance can performe the Act of thinkeing by vertue of a modification which hath noe thing to doe with the Action of thinkeing and | which we see is not that by virtue of which it thinks which is in effect to aske whether substance thinks by vertue of the modification of solidity, when we affirme at the same time that it is by vertue of some other modification and not that of solidity that it thinks

What occasion

No 16

cannot have any other power superadded to it but what must depend upon its solidity For if it can

No 17

having the power of thinkeing

No 18

I have appropriated thinkeing originally to immaterial substance and that I have proved. If I have spoke of thinkeing beings in other places as immaterial ’thas been as I remember entering into a strict examination of the subject of thinkeing I have spoke of upon a supposition the more probable and more received opinion being true. see also what I have answerd to the Bp on this subject, and pray marke to me the places in my Essay where I speake soe. But possibly this objection with the answer to it conteind between these [ ] crockets were better wholy left out. when it is made by these cavillers and the place or places produced that they insist upon the answer will not be hard and then it will be time enough

No 19

How many powers may be superadded to substance we know not we know very few of them and that whereby we pretend to divide all substance is but this one of Solidity. for the other which many talke of as if it were some thing is not any modification of substance nor any thing positive but a bare negation of this one modification of it that we know. But any modification or power superadded to it.

No 20

And substance with motion or mobile and substance immobile

No 21

This mobile substances by reason of its mobility could not certainly be concluded by us to have either the modification of Solidity or of thinkeing

No 22

be a substance with Solidity and mobility.

No 23

it would be a substance with the modifications of Solidity mobility and cogitation or a power of thinkeing

No 24

that which has the modification of Solidity viz the substance we are very sensible

No 25

superadded to solid substance

No 26

superadded to a solid substance

No 27

power of moveing I finde now you meane active or self moveing or as I call it motivity and therefor possibly I have mistaken you in some of the places above

Observations on Mr Bolds papers Dec 98

Diplomatic

1

page Line. Read

§ i.

3 it is one of the

<§ i>

.5 This treatise

<§ i>

6 approbation by those who understood English

<§ i>

14 treated him with

<§> ii

ult creator. To which let me adde

<§> iv

45 have by an immediate comparison of them a visible

<§> v

35 , by laying before their view in the natural order of their connection all the several Ideas, soe as may plainly be seen their agreement or disagreement may in every plainly be seen in every step of the deduction wherein whose agreement or disagreement he has perceive ding has knowledge, and which laying togeather according to their agreement or disagreement makes a good deduction whereby others if they will attend to it may attein knowledg too. For the to the makeing a deduction rationaly supposes himhe that makes it must be supposed certain or knowing or perceiveing of the such a connection of the several parts of Ideas .. conteined in his deduction as makes good the inference d he expresses whole connection which when he has ranged before anothers view in their due order pointing out soe that the agreement or disagreement in each step of the progresse may be plainly perceived he is said to infer right. If

<§ v>

47 and carefully compare all the Ideas conteined in them. He

<§ v>

52 by the intervention of some Ideas conteined in the proposition from whence which

<§> vi

14 of any proposition

<§> x

5 and separable parts

<§ x>

p 6. 2 Q: who is it that has demonstrated that the soule is not a material sensible substance?

p.<§>.xiii

18 In the 3 first lines there seems to be some mistake in the writeing.

§ xv

7 thing we know

<§> xvi

14 undetermined, that it

<§> xvii

13 Notwithstanding. 5 is

<§ xvii>

25 And perhaps etcetera. I doe not see to what purpose all this to the word names is brought in

<§> xviii

Q whether the first may not also be reteined. It seems to me a right answer. In the second paper you rightly

2

take notice of the obscuritie or unintelliblenesse of his question as he puts it but then in answer to it I thinke you must take care to shew that modifica..one modification of matter is not the product of another modification of matter, nor one power the product of another power One modifications that But powers are often the products or consequences of such modifications v: g. the figure of a wedg makes it not a round or a cube which is another in a piece of Iron gives it not the modification of a cube or a globe but yet produces in it the power to cleave wood which it would not have if it had the modification of a cube or a globe. Soe that figure & situation of the parts of a watch give it the not the modification of a bell, but yet gives it the power to move and soe as to marke the hours, but the power of mo. such a motion gives it not the power of sounding like a bell, but modifications are not the seats of modifications nor powers of powers and therefor to say it the question is whether a faculty of t or power of thinkeing can be produced out of the powers of matter is to talke unintelligibly you must keepe these distinct and not say that | powers are not the products of modification for some times they are. but yet powers or faculti it is unintelligible to say that powers faculties i e powers are produced out of powers.

§ xix xx

I doe not see also any fault in the argument of thies e paragraph<s> in the first paper. though in the 2d paper the weaknesse of what MrIs says be more fully laid open

paper 2d

p. No 1

It should have any powers at all i e be capable of any action

No.2

superadded to the substance of matter in any caseand soe in other placeswhere you finde the same expression for powers are not superadded to our Ideas of matter but to the substance of matter as you know for substances alone are agents and have powers

No 3

Then god cannot by the modification of its primary qualities give powers to matter

<§> xxi

8 when under a certain modification a power of thinkeing

<§ xxi>

10 though we doe not know what this modification is nor how this power is superadded to it, It is not

3

said that m. the power of thinkeing is the natural or necessary consequence of any modification of matter that we can conceive that which is said is that Mr L<ocke> says is that he sees noe contradiction in it that god should if he pleased give to certain Systems of matter put to geather i e modified as he thinks fit a power of thinkeing. The power of thinkeing does is not proper or peculiar to a material substance. Nor can we prove demonstratively because we know not upon what modification of substance it depends or is annexd to But for any thing — 2 pap No 4 —It will still be matter. And if god can as a right reverend author has said in this ....... affirmed in this very dispute Change a body into an immaterial substance

§ xxi

18 v. Bp W<orcester’>s 1 Answ p. 78—and to the other since if as.... a right reverend author allows is allowed in this very dispute the same substance may be soe modified as to be sometimes material and sometimes immaterial it is not impossible to thinke it may have the power of thinkeing when it is material as when it is immaterial For as the power of thinkeing doth not make subs Immaterial substance

§ xxii 15 What a faculty of Extension 15 and divisibility. What a faculty of extension is I imagin is hard to be understood when any one shall define an give us any other notion of an immaterial substance but that negative one of substance void of solidity we shall

4

know how far extension or want of extension may be denyed of it

15 And it is noe better to say that omnipotency may superadde to an immaterial substance it m…me..ing immaterial divisibility or any other property of matter and yet that but what a f.l faculty of extension is I doe not understand. A property of thinkeing superadded

4

No 5

being the a qualification of substance where by it is enabled to thinke And all

No 6

this power of thinkeing

No 7

qualification superadded

No 8

As the power of attraction or any other distinct power produceing the Idea of blew or sweet or any other distinct power being superadded to any solid substance

No 9

from its haveing such a power

No 10

when the substance is considerd

No 11

In this and the following lines put power for modification

No 12

If it be said immaterial and actual the | power of thinkeing are the same or however that actual the power of that the | bare power of Thinkeing is to immaterial substance the same that actual solidity is to material this allows that an immaterial substance be may exist without the action of thinkeing and only says that it is capable of thinkeing when ever god will actually give it thought or put it into that action, and such a power as this substance that has the modification of solidity is confessed to have since tis confessed god can give .. may take away solidity from it if he pleases and ..e in this or than afterwards if he pleases give it actual thought Soe that the same substance whether material or immaterial has in it such . a capacity or power of thinkeing that it can have actuall thought when god pleases. Perhaps it will be said that

5

the same substance indeed is capable has | a power ..or is capable of thought or of Solidity when ever god pleases to bestow either of them on it but god cannot give both Solidity and thought to any substance togeather which is the very question in debate and remains to be proved If it be said that actual thinkeing is to immaterial substance as actual solidity is to material substance inseparable from it these two things are to be proved that. 1 that god has created any substance that is always in action or always thinks for thinkeing is an action 2 that if it be soe how it willl follow from thence that because god has made some substances not solid which think always therefor he cannot give to substances which are solid have the modification of solidity a power to thinke sometimes Solidity and thinkeing are evidently distinct Ideas

No 13

our general Idea of substance can be noe otherwise specified but by these two properties of Solidity and thinkeing

No 14

But by a virtue of such a power superadded to the substance under cert a certain modification though it be solid, that it may can think If the power

No 15

Whether substance can performe the Act of thinkeing by vertue of a modification which hath noe thing to doe with the Action of thinkeing and when it is confessed that we know not in what manner nor by vertue of what modification any substance performes the act of thinkeing the modification is by vertue of which any substance is enabled to performe put .. capacity thinks nor with what other modification of substance it is or is not capable to consist and | which we see is not that by virtue of which it thinks which is in effect to aske whether substance thinks by vertue of the modification of solidity, when . we affirme at the same time that it is by vertue of some other modification and not that of solidity that it thinks

6

What occasion

No 16

cannot have any other power superadded to it but what must depend upon its solidity nor performe any other action but what is performd by this modification For if it can

No 17

having the power of thinkeing

No 18

I have appropriated thinkeing originally to immaterial substance and that I have proved. If I have spoke of thinkeing beings in other places as immaterial ’thas been as I remember as speakeing on the more we not speaking of theentering into a strict examination of the subject of thinkeing I have spoke of upon a supposition the more probable and more received opinion being true. see also what I have answerd to the Bp on this subject, and pray marke to me the places in my Essay where I speake soe. But possibly this objection with the answer to it conteind between these [ ] crockets were better wholy left out. when it is made by these cavillers and the place or places produced that they insist upon the answer will not be hard and then it will be time enough

No 19

How many powers may be superadded to substance we know not we pretend yet to know but one which is Solidity know very few of them and that whereby we pretend to divide all substance is but this one of Solidity. for the other which seems many talke of as if it were some thing is not any modification of substance nor any thing positive but a bare negation of th eis only one modification of it that we know. But any modification or power superadded to it.

No 20

And substance with motion or mobile and substance immobile

No 21

This mobile substances by reason of its

7

mobility could not certainly be concluded by us to be have either the modification of Solidity or of thinkeing

No 22

be a substance with Solidity and mobility.

No 23

it would be a substance with the modifications of Solidity mobility and a power of cogitation or a power of thinkeing

No 24

that which has the modification of Solidity viz the substance we are very sensible

No 25

superadded to solid substance

No 26

superadded to a solid substance

No 27

power of moveing I finde now you meane self active or self moveing or as I call it motivity and therefor possibly I have mistaken you in some of the places above cited

8

Observations on Mr Bolds papers Dec 98


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